

Hybrid War Beyond Lebanon: Lessons from the South African Campaign 1976 to 1989

**A Monograph
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Abstract

Hybrid War Beyond Lebanon: Lessons from the South African Campaign 1976 to 1989

A debate is raging within the defense community about the pattern of future war and how best to prepare for it . One idea gaining acceptance is the concept of hybrid war. The term hybrid war as currently understood has multiple meanings and usages. The term is often confused with hybrid warfare leading to a fixation on the tactical implications of hybrid war when the true focus should be on the implications of a hybrid strategy.

This paper reconciles the competing definitions for the concept of hybrid war in order to assess the long-term implications of hybrid war for strategic and operational planners. The concept of hybrid war is inherently an operational and strategic concept. To merely focus at the tactical level is to mischaracterize and misunderstand the very nature of hybrid war. Hybrid wars are innately strategic struggles for legitimacy and control influenced but not necessarily determined exclusively by battlefield actions.

The historical experience of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) from 1978 to 1989 confirms the validity of this definition and provides additional insight to develop both the conceptual understanding of the concept of hybrid war and a plan to fight and win such conflicts. In the case of South Africa, despite winning the conventional and irregular military campaign against both domestic and external insurgencies, the RSA did not obtain its strategic goals. This failure seems to be in keeping with the definition of hybrid war instead of the predominate focus on hybrid warfare. The lessons from this experience indicate that in hybrid war, victory is only possible by achieving success simultaneously on the conventional, unconventional, irregular and domestic and international information battlefields. A series of recommendations based upon insights from the case study for how to plan, and fight a hybrid war conclude the discussion.

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Introduction

A debate is raging within the defense community about the pattern of future war and how best to prepare for it.¹ There is a sense that war is changing, but the defense community is struggling to intellectually capture those changes to prepare for the future. Some argue that the future will be marked by a series of irregular guerilla conflicts, pitting nation states against non-state actors. Others point to future war marked by great power rivalries and interstate wars like the invasion of Georgia.² Alternatively, as some argue, future conflict will be a mixture or hybrid of the two. A growing number of individuals in both the military profession and academia are forecasting that this third category, which they call hybrid war, will be the dominant paradigm of conflict for the near future.³ Advocates of this view point to the Israeli Hezbollah War of 2006 as a textbook example of a developing style of warfare that exists in the troubling middle ground between guerilla and conventional warfare.⁴ Advocates of hybrid war contend that future conflicts will

1 Among many, see Michel A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley "The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Pentagon Team", *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2008):59:76, Greg Grant, "Hybrid Wars", *National Defense* (May 2008). For a characteristic argument see the point counterpoint series in the January 2009 Joint Forces Quarterly between John Nagl and Gian Gentile. John Nagl "Let's Win the Wars We're In" Gian P. Gentile and "Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/i52.htm. (Accessed 1 February 2009).

2 Advocates for preparedness for conventional battles can be found in Gian P. Gentile "Is the U.S. Army ready for conventional war?" *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept 2, 2008, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0902/p09s01-coop.html>., Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Petraeus Doctrine" *Atlantic Monthly*, (October 2008), <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/petraeus-doctrine>, and General Charles Dunlap, "Forget the lessons of Iraq", *Armed Forces Journal*.

3 Erin Simpson, "Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims"(Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Chicago, IL, 7-11 April 2005.); Frank Hoffman, "Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,"(Arlington Virginia :Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007.)

⁴ A criticism of this approach is that it ignores the strategic context of Israeli's involvement in Lebanon. For insight into the strategic setting of Israeli-Lebanon see H. Thomas Davis, *40 Km Into Lebanon: Israel's 1982 Invasion* (Washington., National Defense University Press ,1987) and Daniel Isaac Helmer, *Flipside of the COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982 – 2000* (Leavenworth KS. Combat Studies Institute Press,2006).

be characterized by just such a blending of conventional, irregular, and terrorist tactics that will challenge the United States and its allies by attacking both national will and its military supremacy. The concept of hybrid war has become part of the military strategic discourse: The National Defense Strategy of 2005, the Joint Forces Command Joint Operating Environment of 2007, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 2008 National Defense Strategy all acknowledge this emerging conceptualization of the threat facing the United States. It seems that, as one author contends, “A consensus is emerging that U.S. forces should prepare for ‘hybrid’ wars where they may face unconventional fighters or insurgents, who are likely to be equipped with modern weapons and information technology.”⁵ On the surface, this appears to be a shared understanding of the future. From this shared understanding, in theory, the defense community could prepare intellectually, materially, and doctrinally for the challenges ahead.

Yet, despite the “consensus” that hybrid war is coming, there is in fact no consensus of what the term hybrid war actually means. Some prognosticators define the term as a tactic, some believe it is a place on the continuum of conflict, others see it as an asymmetric strategy, while still others see it as a combination of all three. Multiple definitions for hybrid war have entered strategy and doctrine without a critical analysis.⁶ The current lack of consensus in defining the term risks it becoming nothing more than a catchphrase. Predicting and preparing for the future is difficult enough but the effort becomes almost impossible without a consensus on defining key terms and concepts. Hybrid war in many ways is still not a fully developed concept. The

5 Matthew Rusling, “For the Military, a Future of ‘Hybrid’ Wars”, *National Defense*, September 2008, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/September/Pages/%E2%80%98Hybrid%E2%80%99Wars.aspx>.

6 Despite conflicting definitions, the concept of hybrid war has been incorporated into US Army, USMC and Australian Army emerging doctrine. See also Frank Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century”: 27, 32.

competing definition for the term and the tendency to use it synonymously with hybrid warfare undermines its utility as an intellectual theory to aid in the conceptualization of future conflicts.

If hybrid war will be the dominant form of war for the near future, how can the US Army prepare to fight and win these conflicts? One approach to answer this question seeks lessons in the past to extrapolate lessons for the future. A number of writers have used past experience of hybrid war to expand upon the concept and propose a way ahead.

This paper will reconcile the competing definitions for the concept of hybrid war in order to assess the long-term implications of hybrid war for strategic and operational planners. The validity of this definition is evaluated against a historical experience in order to further develop both the conceptual understanding of the components of hybrid war and to seek lessons for future operations. The combination of an “improved definition” and a less examined case study will advance the debate, help form tentative lessons, and most importantly lead to more research from which to develop a starting point for future action.

This paper begins with an examination of the competing generalizations of hybrid war that have created confusion and misunderstanding of the concept. The dominance of the Lebanon example in the current debate in many ways has prevented the further refinement and testing of the concept of hybrid war. Unfortunately, the Israeli experience in the Second Lebanon War so dominates the discussion, that other useful conflicts and lessons have been excluded. This is partly due to how those authors have defined and conceptualized hybrid war. A more circumspect definition and conceptualization of hybrid war allows us to expand our analysis. The danger of taking such a narrow historical view when developing new concepts is that other lessons and nuances may be lost. One of the earliest papers on hybrid war written before the Second Lebanon

war cited the Republic of South Africa's (RSA) decade long campaign in Angola and Mozambique as an example of this paradigm.⁷ The RSA's controversial actions and the nature of the Apartheid regime have obscured some of the military lessons learned from their operations that may be applicable to understanding how a state organizes and conducts a strategy of hybrid war. The South African campaign to defend the Apartheid system had both conventional, irregular and information operations aspects occurring simultaneously. This paper argues that the South Africa military campaign from 1976 to 1989 offers a cautionary example of planning and conducting operations to win a hybrid war. How the RSA organized its forces and government, how they fought the campaign, and how they ultimately lost, offers a compelling case study of the hybrid war paradigm at the strategic and operational levels.

The bulk of the paper focuses on understanding the strategy and conduct of the South African campaign as analyzed against the hybrid war paradigm. An area of special analysis is the RSA's political and military structures that resulted from its strategic focus on defending Apartheid. Hybrid war theory advocates a complete interagency approach and commitment to fighting future threats. The whole of government approach in the South African experience metamorphosed into military domination and primacy of planning and operations. The RSA efforts included illegal covert operations against domestic threats, cross border strikes against insurgent sanctuaries and efforts to destabilize nations opposed to the Apartheid regime through direct action and proxy forces. These actions undermined the legitimacy and the strategic effectiveness of South Africa to influence opinion in both domestic and international audiences. Therefore, despite winning the conventional and unconventional military campaign against both

⁷ Simpson, "Thinking About Modern Conflict": 4.

domestic and external insurgencies, the RSA did not obtain its strategic goals. This failure seems to be in keeping with a definition of hybrid war instead of the predominate focus on hybrid warfare. Under this construct, victory is only possible by achieving success simultaneously on the conventional, irregular, and domestic and international information battlefields. This and other lessons from the campaign are examined and further developed throughout the discussion that follows.

Hybrid War /Hybrid Warfare: Competing Definitions

Defining hybrid war is not just a matter of semantics. Military professionals are specifically concerned with analyzing recent battlefield trends to intellectually, materially, and doctrinally prepare for future conflicts. One of the means to do this is to develop a common understanding of the emerging strategic reality. If the future is to be marked by the new paradigm of hybrid war as increased evidence indicates, it is necessary to prepare strategists and planners to understand the new environment and take prudent steps for success. A muddled definition of hybrid war that is incorporated into doctrine without intellectual rigor could leave the United States unprepared for future challenges. A poor definition reduces this concept to a buzzword and negates the intellectual value of the concept. A poorly scaled definition runs the risk of confusing tactics with strategy and war with warfare. This disconnect has been a reoccurring shortfall of American military operations.⁸ If the United States is to prepare for the future, it must develop a common language and understanding. Accepting the concept of hybrid war forces the US to develop a broader understanding of war. For US Army operational level planners, hybrid war

⁸ Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward and American Way of War* (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle PA, 2004), 7, 12, 16. He observes most pointedly on page 7, that “American way of war tends to shy away from thinking about the complicated process of turning military success triumphs, whether on the scale of major campaigns or small unit actions into strategic successes.”

presents a challenge to synchronize multiple actions, multiple forms of warfare, across multiple lines of operations , all occurring simultaneously to achieve a strategic impact. No longer can dominance in one form of warfare be decisive. Rather winning these emerging hybrid wars will require skill at all levels. A wider definition/conceptualization is important to strategic success and victory. As Colin Gray explains, “... to be good, even excellent at fighting-that is to say warfare- is not necessarily to be proficient in the conduct of war.”⁹ This new reality will have long-term ramifications for US training, equipping, and understanding what constitutes military and political success.

The concept of hybrid war that has slowly worked its way into the vocabulary of military strategists means different things to each author. There are three main approaches to defining the concept of hybrid war and hybrid warfare. Each different definition for hybrid war also implies how best to win such a conflict. The first approach to defining hybrid war is primarily based on the threat, and focuses mainly on the tactical level of war. A criticism of this school of thought is that its advocates use the concept of hybrid war and hybrid warfare interchangeably. The two terms are not the same. As Colin Gray makes clear, “war is a legal concept, a social institution, and is a compound idea that embraces the total relationship between belligerents. In contrast, warfare refers to the actual conduct of war in its military dimension.”¹⁰ This in turn equates means with ends and lends itself towards seeking tactical solutions rather than strategic understanding. This threat-based approach/definition has been the most dominant and has been

⁹ Colin Gray, *War peace and International Relations: An introduction to Strategic History* (Routledge: New York, 2007), 7.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

incorporated into service doctrine.¹¹ A second definition of hybrid warfare defines it as a new phase or category of warfare along a continuum between conventional and irregular warfare. Advocates of this definition discuss the concept at the tactical level but also expand their thinking to investigate the impacts of hybrid tactics on a nation's overall strategy. This second school of thought sees hybrid warfare as a tactic with operational and strategic impacts but do not address the implications of hybrid war as a strategy. A third approach to defining hybrid war is more strategically focused. This conceptualization sees the blurring of tactics and categories of warfare as merely a component of a new paradigm of warfare. This third definition is more focused on understanding how an opponent uses hybrid tactics to wage hybrid war and how to win such wars.¹² Implied in its definition is a greater emphasis on linking diverse operations to achieve strategic goals.¹³ This paper argues that hybrid war is inherently an operational and strategic concept. To merely focus at the tactical level is to mischaracterize and misunderstand the very nature of hybrid war. Hybrid wars are innately strategic struggles for legitimacy and control influenced but not necessarily determined exclusively by battlefield actions. Any definition that ignores this linkage fails to address the essence of the term.

11 The most obvious example is the United States Marine Corps Expeditionary *Maneuver from the Sea: The capstone Operational Concept* June 2008 and USMC *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025*. This paper contends that what the US Army calls full Spectrum Operations is many aspects hybrid war by another name. The key difference is that hybrid war has a more explicit information component than found in full spectrum operations.

12 J. McCuen conversation and email with author November 2008.

13 McCuen calls it winning three wars on one battlefield. Similar linkages of diverse actions are found in current doctrine. See Joint Publication 5.0 *Joint Operation Planning*, for discussion of Operational Art and United States Army Field Manual 3.0 *Operations* for Full spectrum operations.

Threat based Hybrid War and Hybrid Warfare

The definition of hybrid war based on the threat or as a tactic has its origins in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2005. The 2005 NDS portrayed enemy capabilities in a chart that depicted future threat as coming from one of four categories. The threat could be classified as traditional, irregular, catastrophic, or disruptive.¹⁴ The US would prepare and organize its forces to defeat a future threat originating from one (or a combination) of these categories. Little noticed at the time was the caveat that these categories were blurring. As the NDS explained the “most dangerous circumstances arise when we face a complex of challenges. ... in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular, or catastrophic forms of warfare.”¹⁵ This marked a significant shift in American defense thinking about the threat and the dangers posed by non-state actors.¹⁶

Despite recognizing the possibility of blending of threats, and a changing security environment, the text of 2005 NDS unintentionally reinforced the prevailing idea that war could be categorized /defined as still being either regular or irregular. The NDS defined the future based on the enemy’s tactical choices as they related to one of four categories and ignored many of the operational and strategic implications. The NDS was an early sign of growing acceptance within the DoD community that the collective understanding of what constituted the threat had changed. Defense planners were more and more intellectually uncomfortable with an opponent being

14 This is often referred to as the “Quad Chart”, see Chart 2 Appendix One.

15 Donald Rumsfeld, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005,2.

16 Nathan Freier, Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century: Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 63. “NDS 05’s framers believed that early, abstract recognition of real change in the environment would enable the defense establishment to thoughtfully reexamine and dispense with significant portions of conventional defense wisdom long overcome by strategic circumstances. The challenges offered defense strategists a different philosophical lens through which they might assess the department’s readiness to fulfill its numerous 21st century responsibilities.”

confined to the categories defined in the National Defense Strategy. A number of authors began to think that, "...tomorrow's conflicts may not be easily categorized into simple classifications of conventional or irregular. Conventional and irregular forces, combatants and noncombatants, and even the physical/kinetic and virtual dimensions of conflict are converging."¹⁷ Subsequent service and joint concepts began incorporating the idea of convergence of threats. The Joint Forces Command *Joint Operating Environment* of 2007, the 2006 QDR, and the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* all acknowledge this emerging style of threat. From these different works, multiple definitions and typologies for this new threat concept emerged. Initially proponents described the concept as "multi modal", "fourth generational warfare" or "complex irregular warfare" but eventually a growing number of authors have come to call this new style of warfare as hybrid war or hybrid warfare.¹⁸ The term hybrid caught on and was quickly incorporated into emerging doctrine and policy debates often without a consensus on what was actually meant by the word. While there is no accepted definition of hybrid war at the Department of Defense level, individual services and service leader have begun incorporating the term into doctrine, strategy, and public statements.¹⁹

The leading proponent of the concept of hybrid warfare using a threat-based definition within the DoD is the United States Marine Corps. The USMC has included the concept in its

17 Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Wars Defined", *USMC Strategic Visions Group*.
www.quantico.usmc.mil/download.aspx?Path=../Uploads/Files/SVG_Hybrid%20Warfare-%20defined.doc.

18 Hoffman, "Conflict in the 21st Century", provides an overview of these different terms and their relation to the development of concept of hybrid war. Unfortunately, Hoffman uses the terms war and warfare interchangeably in discussing this development.

19 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, "A Balanced Strategy -Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age." *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009. "When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the "high end" from the "low end," the conventional from the irregular, armored divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK-47s on the other. ...the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction ...being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare."

capstone Doctrine and long term strategic planning. In a document entitled *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025*, the Corps postulated that the lines between conventional and irregular war would be characterized by

“the blurring of what was previously thought to be distinct forms of war or conflict — conventional war, irregular challenges, terrorism, and criminality — into what can be described as hybrid challenges... illustrated by combinations of various approaches including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, and criminal disorder.”²⁰

Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine officer, member of the Potomac institute, and key member of the USMC Strategic Visions Group (SVG) at USMC Headquarters is the most cited author on hybrid warfare. Hoffman and the SVG have influenced a number of USMC and Department of Navy strategic documents. Hoffman’s work, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, is the most widely disseminated and discussed on the topic and has had a visible impact on USMC thinking. Hoffman developed the following definition of hybrid warfare:

“Hybrid Wars combine a range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. The adversary employs all forms of conflict, perhaps simultaneously to gain an advantage. These multi-modal conflicts can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battle space to achieve synergistic effects.”²¹

Similar thinking influenced the other services. The authors of the US Army’s 2008 Field Manual 3.0 *Operations* dealt with the concept of hybrid warfare by referring to it using the term “full spectrum operations.” The Chief of Staff of the US Army echoed this approach in an article in Army Magazine. He wrote, “Hybrid threats—diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional,

20 United States Marine Corps, *USMC Vision and Strategy 2025* November 2008, 21. The Department of the Navy has incorporated similar threat based definitions into its Maritime strategy and recent US Army states include the term as well.

21 Frank Hoffman, “Hybrid Wars Defined.”

irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities—will make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of national power. The adoption of the concept of full spectrum operations was a realization that the previous categories were no longer sufficient.”²²

There are implications for the joint force in this debate as well. One of the co-authors with Frank Hoffman on a 2005 article entitled “Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” published in the US Navy War College Journal *Proceedings* is Lieutenant General James Mattis, the current commander of United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). In that article Mattis and Hoffman reject the NDS 2005 categories and embrace hybrid war. “We expect future enemies to look at the four approaches as a sort of menu and select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them. We do not face a range of four separate challengers as much as the combination of novel approaches—a merger of different modes and means of war. This unprecedented synthesis is what we call Hybrid Warfare.”²³ As Commander of USJFCOM Mattis is in a unique position to incorporate his concept of hybrid warfare into US military joint doctrine.²⁴

22 Gen. George W. Casey Jr., “America’s Army In an Era Of Persistent Conflict”, *Army*, October 2008. <http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/armyarchive/October2008/Documents/Casey.pdf>. While acknowledging the need for innovation and multiple combinations of elements of national power, these comments still reflect a focus on ‘what’ the threat is and can do.

22. Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, and Frank G. Hoffman, “Future War: The Rise of Hybrid Wars”, *Proceedings* 13 (November 2005): 18-19.

23 Hoffman, “Hybrid War defined .”

24 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has also quoted Hoffman in his public statements indicating Hoffman’s influence on the highest levels of DoD. See Gates, “Balanced Strategy.” Of significance is the use of Hoffman’s quote in context of procurement.

Threat based definitions of Hybrid war, like Hoffman's, have significantly advanced the DoD understanding of future conflicts. There is now a growing realization that the impacts of this concept may be long lasting and extend beyond mere tactical concerns. As Hoffman himself observes, "The operational risk of a hybrid threat may exceed that of major regional conflict in the near to mid-range."²⁵ This initial definition of hybrid war is a vital first step in conceptualizing the future but its underlying approach still focuses primarily on the 'what' of the challenge and not the 'how'. Hoffman's definition weights its efforts at tactical problems and tactical solutions at the expense of strategic understanding. Under a threat-based construct, the focus of thought and action is on the ways the threat employs hybrid tactics and how to counter them, rather than on the broader strategy that those tactics are part of. This approach allows the opponent's tactics and technology to define the conflict not his strategy. Implied in this definition is that different tactics, training and equipment can negate the tactical advantage of the enemy²⁶ While Hoffman's definition and understanding has grown to include some operational and strategic elements, the primary focus remains fighting and winning at the tactical level.²⁷ Like Moltke's interpretation of Clausewitz before him, others have re-interpreted Hoffman's definition as proposing pure tactical solutions. Much of the current debate about hybrid warfare further reinforces this belief. In one recent article, the definition of hybrid war was followed by

24. Hoffman, "Hybrid Wars Defined". "This is due to its higher likelihood and the increasing lethality and thus greater consequences of the conflict. This does not suggest the end of traditional or conventional warfare. But it does present a complicating factor for defense planning in the 21st Century."

26 Frank Hoffman, "How Marines are preparing for hybrid wars", *Armed Forces Journal*. , <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/03/1813952/> (Accessed 27 Oct, 2008), Captain Scott A. Cuomo and Captain Brian J. Donlon, "Training a "Hybrid" Warrior at the Infantry Officer Course :Will a proof of concept exercise find a permanent home?", *Marine Corps Gazette*, (February 2008,50-55).

27 Frank Hoffman, "Hybrid Warfare and Challenges", *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Issue 52, 1st Quarter 2009): 34:39.

suggestions for improvements and purchases of equipment. “Hybrid wars can be created by states, proxy forces or armed groups... To counter these enemies, U.S. forces should prepare to be flexible, experts said. They also should buy “multifunctional” equipment that is adaptable to various forms of combat, such as unmanned air vehicles that are armed with strike weapons.”²⁸ This debate highlights the problem with this approach to hybrid war. It fails to clearly distinguish between warfare and war. A definition that focuses almost entirely on the threat and the military dimension cannot claim to capture the idea of hybrid war nor provide sufficient concepts to fight and win such a conflict. Furthermore, this perpetuates American cultural approaches to warfare based on technological solutions and firepower, which may be inappropriate for the challenges inherent in hybrid war. As Antulio Echevarria notes such hardware and capabilities based focused approaches creates a style of warfare that “centers on taking down an opponent quickly, rather than on finding ways to apply military force in the pursuit of broader political aims... Capabilities based planning is about winning battles-not wars-in the information age.”²⁹ A threat /capabilities based conceptualization of hybrid warfare reinforces this error by maintaining the focus on winning battles when the effort needs to be on winning wars.³⁰

28 Matthew Rusling, “For the Military, a Future of ‘Hybrid’ Wars”, National Defense (September 2008) , <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2008/September/Pages/%E2%80%98Hybrid%E2%80%99Wars.aspx>—The quote is more troubling in that it is from General Fastabend a senior Army strategist.

29 Echevarria, *Toward and American Way of War*, 16.

30 Hoffman acknowledges the need to move beyond battles but he still maintains his focus on the opponents and what technology of tactics they can bring to bear to complicate the engagement. When he writes, “We can no longer focus on battles against preferred enemies, vice campaigns versus thinking opponents”, he is merely acknowledging the protraction caused by enemy capabilities not necessarily their strategy, nor is he proposing an action/process to conduct such campaigns. Hoffman, “Conflict in the 21st Century”: 57-58.

Hybrid War as Part of the Spectrum of Conflict

Building upon Hoffman's and others initial work is a second category of definitions that moved beyond hybrid warfare and tactical implications to examine the concept of hybrid war and its implications at the operational and strategic levels. Advocates of this approach view hybrid war as a new and adaptive style of conflict that exists in the seam between conventional warfare and insurgency. Hybrid war is presented as a separate phase of a conflict, or an exacerbating condition of ongoing conflict. Proponents of this expanded view trace the intellectual origins of the concept to such diverse concepts as those of Mao Tse Tung, T.X. Hammes' description of Fourth Generation Warfare, and the delimiting of the battlefield found in *Unrestricted Warfare* by Chinese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.³¹ All of these works support Colin Gray's observation that all "we can predict with confidence is that there is going to be a blurring, a further blurring, of warfare categories."³²

A significant move towards a discussion of hybrid war in terms of ends rather than means was Erin Simpson's paper, "Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims." Simpson, writing from a political science viewpoint, analyzed current operations and found that existing typology (intrastate, extra state, etc.) was insufficient to capture the changes in warfare. She believed an overemphasis on actors and tactics had clouded the understanding of these new hybrid wars. She argued that clear distinctions could only be drawn when one looked "more broadly [at] the role of war aims and strategy in modern conflict"³³ She went on to explain

31 For more on these influences see Hoffman, *21st Century Conflict*, 17-20,24,30.

32 Colin Gray Quoted in Hoffman, "Hybrid Wars Defined".

33 Simpson, "Thinking about Modern Wars", 4. She continued, "This limited theorizing has hampered our ability to fully understand the broad range of conflicts we observe in the international system, including these "new" hybrid wars currently dominating our attention.

that that the current categorization of warfare had limited utility in explaining modern conflicts.

She concluded:

“...Hybrid wars are neither wholly new, nor identical to our ideal types of conflict. ... Understanding them will continue to be a key national security concern. Unfortunately, the analytic framework currently in use makes it difficult to discern the meaningful similarities and differences between these wars and those fought before them. ...what is needed, instead, is a shift away from rubrics that focus on actors toward one that emphasizes war aims and strategy. I believe it is in terms of these two elements that we will find the richest analysis and most fruitful conclusions.”³⁴

Simpson’s definition broadened the concept of hybrid war to include the strategy and war aims and placed the focus at the strategic and operational rather than the tactical level. Joining Simpson in extending hybrid war beyond tactical considerations was Max Boot who acknowledged that the blurring of categories caused by technology forced one to address the strategic choices made by opponents. He wrote, “The boundaries between ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare are blurring. Even non-state groups are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve of states. And even states will increasingly turn to unconventional strategies to blunt the impact of American power.”³⁵

Hybrid War as Strategy

The third category of defining hybrid war best captures the linkages between actions and strategy initially identified by Simpson. Retired US Army Colonel John McCuen, a noted counterinsurgency theorist, offered a new definition of hybrid war focused at the strategic level.³⁶ Writing in *Military Review*, he defined hybrid war as: “full spectrum wars with both physical and

³⁴ Ibid., 25.

³⁵ Max Boot, *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (New York: Random House, 2006), 472.

conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for, control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population, the support of the home fronts of the intervening nations, and the support of the international community.³⁷ This third approach creates a concept around which the US can begin to fight and win hybrid wars.

Unlike other definitions that focus on the tactical level, McCuen's definition addresses the concept at the operational and strategic levels of war. His definition expands beyond the military domain to embrace the totality of the enemy's action and strategy. It is the competing systems and strategies and the results of their interaction on others that make hybrid wars different from the traditional understanding of war. McCuen's conceptualization of hybrid war was the first to explicitly emphasize the psychological domain of war. He went on to define the decisive component of hybrid wars: "Hybrid wars are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously and more decisively attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing them."³⁸ To accomplish this he proposes a shift to a new paradigm of thinking about war and warfare. He believes that previous definitions, while advancing the understanding of hybrid war as a concept, are of little utility in fighting and winning such conflicts. McCuen believes that under a hybrid war paradigm "achieving strategic objectives requires success in all of these diverse conventional

36 Robert Cassidy, "The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War" *Military Review*, Nov-Dec. 2007, 115. McCuen is well known for his counterinsurgency writings. His book *Art Of Counter Revolutionary War* is cited in US Army FM 3-24 and was used by many nations including South Africa in developing their own COIN doctrines.

37 Colonel John J McCuen, "Hybrid Wars", *Military Review* March-April 2008:107-113.

38 Ibid. 38. He is clear in his conclusion that he sees hybrid war as a shift in paradigms. "We must strategize, plan, and conduct war under a new paradigm—hybrid war."

and asymmetric battlegrounds.”³⁹ As such, McCuen offers a broader systemic view of conflict than is captured in either the Hoffman or the Simpson approaches. McCuen’s concept realizes that war aims and strategy subsumes actors and capabilities. Under his definition, actors and capabilities are enablers rather than the defining feature of hybrid war.

Furthermore, McCuen believes the current understanding of hybrid war as a tactic with operational and strategic impacts does not go far enough to alter American strategic thinking.⁴⁰ As he argues, the other definitions of hybrid war focus too much on the “what” (tactics employed by both sides) of hybrid war and not enough on the “how” (their strategy). His shift in focus properly distinguishes between hybrid war, a strategic concept, and hybrid warfare, a way to wage hybrid war. The difference is not merely semantics but speaks to matters of scale, structures, and intellectual understanding. As McCuen argues, it is a paradigmatic shift in thinking about and conceptualizing war. McCuen’s concept is the most developed of the three schools of thought. His conceptualization places great emphasis on creative thinking, integration of multiple actions by different military and government agencies over time for a specific purpose.⁴¹ “Hybrid war appears new in that it requires simultaneous rather than sequential success

39 Ibid.,108.

40 Ibid. “We need to stop planning operationally and strategically as if we were going to be waging two separate wars, one with tanks and guns on a conventional battlefield, the other with security and stabilization of the population. Symmetric and asymmetric operations are critical, interrelated parts of hybrid war, and we must change our military and political culture to perceive, plan, and execute them that way”

41 In many aspects, McCuen is calling for the application of operational art in hybrid war. Joint Publication 5.0 , *Joint Operation Planning* , IV-1, defines Operational art as the “application of creative imagination by commanders and staff-supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience- to design strategies ,campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. ...Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to plan, prepare, execute and assess. ...without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected engagements.” See appendix Three for an initial attempt at developing Operational Art for hybrid wars.

in these diverse but related “population battlegrounds.”⁴² Not surprisingly, the battle to gain and maintain public support requires different strategies, tactics, doctrine, and weapons than those used to control the physical and human terrain in combat zones. As Lawrence Freedman observes “superiority in the physical environment is of little value unless it can be translated into an advantage in the information environment.”⁴³ If anything is missing from McCuen’s definition, it is a clarification of, and an emphasis on, the role of moral considerations in obtaining legitimacy.⁴⁴ Implied but not explicitly stated in McCuen argument is that shared moral considerations weigh heavily in determining legitimacy. While he addresses the linkage between physical and cognitive concerns, he does not explicitly discuss the impact of moral implications on physical actions and or cognitive perceptions of participants in his definition.⁴⁵

Under McCuen’s definition, hybrid war can be summarized as a war of strength, influence, and ideas. Hybrid war is war waged simultaneously in the physical, cognitive and moral domains. Its defining feature is that combatants fight conventional, unconventional, and influence battles using all instruments of national power to physically or cognitively compel,

42 McCuen, “Hybrid Wars”: 108.

43 Quoted in Thomas Mackubin Owens, “Reflections on Future Warfare”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 61. No3 (Summer 2008):70.

44 Legitimacy is often discussed but not explicitly defined in current doctrine. US Army Field Manual 3.07 *Stability Operations*, discusses it in some depth. On page1-7, “Legitimacy is a multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective. [It involves]... the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed. It reflects, or is a measure of, the perceptions of several groups.” McCuen “Hybrid Wars”, 112 acknowledges, “Competent strategic communications and the perception of moral legitimacy become the determining factors.”

45 Moral in this sense is used to express the both the cognitive aspect and the ethical facets of the thoughts. It is at once a “perceptual or psychological rather than tangible or practical in nature or effect ,a moral victory moral support, ” but also captures the concept of “: expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior ,a moral poem, c: conforming to a standard of right behavior d: sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgment.” (Both from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/moral>) The interaction between these two facets of the word

coerce or influence an opponent, target population, and international communities to support the desired strategic goal. Unlike many previous conceptions, success in conventional or counterinsurgency operations establishes conditions for success in influence operations. This expanded understanding of what matters in hybrid war at the strategic and operational level is the most important planning challenge confronting the United States. One nation that attempted such a radical paradigm shift in planning and conducting warfare is the Republic of South Africa. From 1976 to 1989, South Africa developed a strategy to wage war throughout Africa against both conventional and unconventional opponents while simultaneously conducting information operations to influence opinion at home and in the international community. A study of that conflict may enable military leaders to better conceptualize hybrid wars in order to prepare to win these conflicts.

War in South Africa (1976 to 1989) as an Example of Hybrid War

The Republic of South Africa's (RSA) campaigns from 1976 to 1989 has continuing relevance for understanding, conducting and conceptualizing the role of the military in fighting hybrid wars. While acknowledging that South Africa is not the United States, and that no one example can provide an all-encompassing insight, there are salient concepts and lessons that can be learned from the South African experience. The South Africa military campaign throughout Southern Africa and in the international arena offers a cautionary example of planning and conducting operations to win a hybrid war as defined by McCuen. By expanding the study of hybrid war beyond technologically defined warfare and beyond the Lebanon example it is possible to expand the scope of understanding of hybrid war. The South African example offers

moral can be summarized as "I think it is the right thing to do, and it is acceptable to my own ethics." This is an important concept to establish early on, as what is moral as can be decisive for hybrid wars.

an opportunity to examine the concept against a longer duration campaign guided by a discernible and unified strategy.



Figure 1: Nations of Southern Africa 2008

From 1978 to 1989, the RSA waged a well-developed and centrally controlled campaign to preserve the white minority government.⁴⁶ All state actions were unified and controlled under a civil military strategic view called total strategy. The structure of the South African Government was reshaped by this strategy to make the military the dominate decision maker under a true comprehensive or whole of government approach. This approach theoretically enabled the RSA to conduct conventional operations, external and internal counterinsurgency operations, and internal and external information operations simultaneously for a unified strategic goal. Under a

⁴⁶ White rule in South Africa is commonly referred to as Apartheid. The Apartheid system was designed to ensure “the survival of the Afrikaner people and culture. The ultimate threat ...is the disappearance of the distinctive Afrikaner Volk or nation, engulfed by the black majority.” Robert Jaster, “South Africa and its Neighbours: The Dynamics of Regional Conflict” (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), 36.

strategic definition of hybrid war winning in all three components/ battles simultaneously is essential to fulfilling the strategic goals of the campaign. In the case of the South Africans, the inability to obtain success in the information arena both domestically and internationally negated their tactical and operational successes. The RSA misapplied their resources by failing to properly use the leverage gained by their immediate military and economic advantages to achieve informational benefits in furtherance of their overall strategic goals. This result seems to confirm the validity of McCuen's hybrid war paradigm's emphasis on the need for the artful linkage of military gains to obtain psychological victories amongst both domestic audiences and the broader international community. As such, the South African experience offers a means for discussion of how the United States could begin to conceptualize and prepare to fight and win future hybrid wars.

Overview of South African Strategic Context

The South African Campaign from 1978 to 1989 was a long and complex struggle that defies easy explanations and short summations.⁴⁷ To place the events of the time in the proper context it is necessary to begin with an overview of the larger strategic context of the conflict and how it influenced the campaign.⁴⁸ The Republic of South Africa was a minority ruled state intent on preserving the status quo by defeating both internal and external threats through a coordinated whole of government campaign. As a means of comparison to the concept of hybrid war, the

⁴⁷ The campaign was referred to by most South Africans as the 'border wars' and by the ANC and SWAPO as the 'liberation struggle.' The best single volume histories are Wilhelm Steenkamp, *South Africa's Border War-1966-1989*. (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1989). Anthony Clayton, *Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950* (Los Angeles: UCLA Press, 1999), John W. Turner, *Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to the Present* (New York, NY: Sterling Publications, 1998).

⁴⁸ A detailed chronology of the campaign is found in Appendix Two. Issues of time and space have led to consolidation of some of the operations and such there are a number of neglected areas that leave room for further research.

discussion concludes with specific analysis of the symmetric, asymmetric and information components of the RSA strategy and how they were or were not properly linked to their strategic goals.

Ruling government perceptions of the human terrain, ethnic demographics, and the concept of racial identity, drove South African strategic thinking. The white population of the RSA constituted only eighteen percent of the population and was projected to shrink proportionally over time. The white population was further divided between ethnic Afrikaners who controlled most of the government and English speakers who had substantial control of South African industry. The black population constituted approximately seventy five percent of the South Africa population. Divisions existed between black population based on tribal and class identities which were exploited by the RSA. Mixed race and Asian or Indian citizens, classified as ‘coloured’ by South African policies, constituted approximately thirteen percent of the RSA population.⁴⁹ South African strategic thinking sought to ensure the interest and goals of the white population were met by controlling and mobilizing the other ethnic groups.

The military situation in Southern Africa fundamentally shifted in 1975 with the withdrawal of Portugal from their colonies in Angola and Mozambique. Previously the RSA strategic thinking was based on the “white” *cordon sanitaire* provided by friendly regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia to prevent the establishment of bases of support for internal Black Nationalist movements within striking range of South Africa’s borders. With the

⁴⁹ Accurate and objective population census data from the Apartheid era is difficult to find as RSA policies intentionally did not count black citizens living in mandated homelands which were nominally independent. Some estimates are found in Stephen R. Lewis, *The Economics Of Apartheid* (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), 23. For the ethnic and population complexities of South African culture see Rita M. Byrnes, ed. *South Africa: A Country Study*. (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996).

withdrawal of Portugal, irregular movements in Southern Africa like the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), and the African National Congress (ANC) were afforded increased state sponsorship and sanctuaries to recruit and train forces.⁵⁰ The loss of the buffer zones increased the access of resistance movement's to South African territory while simultaneously denying the RSA strategic depth in its defense. With the loss of the buffer provided by friendly regimes, what had once been an internal problem that could be contained by police forces now required an increasing commitment of military assets.

To synchronize this response the RSA adopted a strategic framework known as Total Strategy, which sought to mobilize all aspects of the state to fight to preserve the regime against domestic and external threats originating from Black Nationalism and international communism. At the time Total Strategy was praised as, "the ultimate development of low intensity warfare strategy."⁵¹ During the time of Total Strategy, the RSA conducted over sixteen significant conventional offensive operations throughout the region.⁵² The largest operations were conducted in the neighboring nation of Angola where the RSA fought a mix of Cuban, Angolan, and Namibian guerillas in both conventional and irregular battles.⁵³ This conflict was further

50 The conflict in South Africa is characterized by an array of opposition groups with associated acronyms for their political and military wings which can create substantial confusion for those not intimately familiar with the campaign. To save confusion unless absolutely necessary this paper will refer to the both the political and military wings of organizations using the political wings name, i.e. the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) will be referred to by their parent organizations SWAPO and the ANC respectively. A complete list of Acronyms is in the glossary

51 Stephen Metz, "Pretoria's Total Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare in Southern Africa," *Comparative Strategy*, 6 (No. 4, 1987):458.

52 David E. Johnson, Adam Grissom, Olga Olikier "In the Middle of the Fight an Assessment of Medium-Armored Forces in Past Military Operations" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 73.

53 South Africa fought a diverse mix of opponents in its external operations. They faced Soviet and East German advisors, pilots, and intelligence specialists, Cuban mechanized forces, armored vehicles manned by mixed

complicated by the Cold War rivalries between the United States and the Soviet Union who provided varying levels of support to their respective allies. Simultaneously, the RSA fought a counterinsurgency campaign to maintain control and influence over the territory of South West Africa /Namibia.⁵⁴ The RSA conducted a sustained irregular warfare campaign throughout Southern Africa in order to deter nations from offering sanctuary and support to South African opposition movements. To destabilize nations opposed to South Africa goals both militarily and economically, the RSA developed and provided military support to Anti-communist resistance movements in Angola and Mozambique. These destabilization efforts in turn were supported by a covert campaign of targeted assassinations, intimidation and media manipulation throughout the region and internationally in an attempt to influence opinion.⁵⁵

The black opposition movements turned increasingly towards the Soviet bloc for outside support to counter South African efforts. With the aid of advisors and combat forces, the opposition groups modified their tactics and strategy to include the use of sophisticated weaponry, more amorphous military organizations and well developed information campaigns targeting both indigenous audiences and the international community. Opposition group's

units of Angolans and Cuban, African National Congress guerillas, Namibian guerillas, local militias and elements of armies from Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Lesotho, and Zaire.

54 South West Africa, now Namibia, was a former German colony that South Africa was given responsibility for under a League of Nations mandate at the end of the First World War. Over time, South Africa began to treat the area as a colony or part of the RSA itself. The United Nations (UN) deemed this an illegal occupation. The UN recognized the guerilla opposition, the South West African Peoples Organization as the sole and legitimate voice of the area and granted them observer status at the UN. See Colonel C.J. Nöthling, "Military Chronicle Of South West Africa (1915 - 1988)." *South African Defence Force Review 1989*. <http://www.rhodesia.nl/swatf.htm> Accessed 23 Sep 2008 and Morgan Norval, *Death in the Desert the Namibian Tragedy*. (Washington, DC: Selous Foundation Press, 1989). For an overview of RSA operations in Namibia in context of the War on Terrorism see MAJ Sean McWilliams, "No More Sanctuaries? Easier Said Than Done.: Cross Border Offensives In Support Of COIN Operations, Lessons From The South African Experience"(Maxwell AFB,AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 2008).

55 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Vol2, Chapter 2: "The State outside South Africa between 1960 and 1990". <http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%202.pdf> (Accessed 13 December 2008),

information operations influenced international actors and organizations to bring increased pressure upon the RSA. Increased international isolation and arms boycotts in turn forced the RSA to husband its resources. Shortages in key weapons systems led to the development of indigenous South African military systems that further strained the resources of the country. The RSA in turn attempted to use its control of strategic minerals and resources as a means of leverage with the international community. The RSA maximized its control of the regional economic infrastructures to further coerce less economically developed regional nations to acquiesce to South African policies. All these military, non-military, and cultural efforts were unified under the structures of Total Strategy to try to decrease support for organizations and policies hostile towards South Africa for as little financial and human cost to the white government as possible.⁵⁶

From 1977 to 1983, the RSA achieved significant success in implementing the Total Strategy and were able to coerce significant concessions from regional governments. Treaties with Mozambique and Zambia limited the freedom of action of domestic insurgents and made infiltration into South Africa much more difficult. This changed political situation allowed South Africa to devote additional resources to COIN operations in Namibia. From 1977 to 1983, the RSA was able to shift some of the burden of the conflict away from its primarily white conscript conventional forces by creating and fielding an indigenous military force called the South West African Territorial Forces (SWATF) to assume pacification duties within the territory.⁵⁷ The RSA funded, advised and sought international recognition for a local government opposed to

⁵⁶The definitive overview of structural changes made in South African government is Annette Seeger, *The Military In The Making Of The Modern South Africa* (London: Taurus, 1996).

communism to serve as an interim government in preparation for possible independence.⁵⁸ Security increased within Namibia to the point that South African conventional forces were released from COIN duties. The RSA conventional forces efforts shifted to providing border security, civic actions, and support to local police, and paramilitary units. The SWATF assumed increased responsibility for COIN operations in the more densely populated areas. RSA forces meanwhile continued to conduct preemptive raids across the border to disrupt enemy infiltration and offensives against South Africans sponsored anti-communist groups. Outside of Namibia, South African's proxy forces controlled large swaths of Angola and Mozambique preventing further infiltration by guerillas into RSA territories.⁵⁹ Believing they were operating from a position of strength, and that their external operations had isolated the black population from communist influence, the white regime began a series of domestic political reforms in an attempt to undercut the discontent of internal opposition movements. World media continued to excoriate South Africa for its Apartheid and preemptive military policies, which created diplomatic strains with the West and economic tensions within South Africa's business communities. The international community while opposed to the RSA's Apartheid policies and occupation of Namibia though in many cases were still willing to trade and conduct negotiations with the white

57 Unlike many other units in the South African military, the SWATF was primarily recruited from the black population. H.R. Heitman, *South African War Machine* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 146.

58 Morgan, *Death in the Desert*, 94-99. This group known as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) and the Interim government was a collection of Namibian mixed race and mixed tribal political parties that opposed SWAPO. The DTA ran Namibian internal politics under varying levels of RSA control from 1977 to 1989. SWAPO exclusion made the organization unacceptable to the international community. For the RSA, the simultaneous development of the DTA and indigenous military forces allowed them to claim legitimately that the RSA was working towards a democratic solution. Since independence, the DTA has continued to exist as an opposition party in the SWAPO dominated Namibian legislature.

59 The RSA sponsored two large proxy forces, UNITA in Angola and the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR/RENAMO) in Mozambique. Working by with and through indigenous forces whether with advisors or Special Forces is cited frequently as a key component of hybrid war.

regime. However, by 1984, that all changed. The RSA leadership political decision in 1983 not to follow up military success with significant political reform at home unhinged the RSA's strategy. The halfhearted nature of the reforms undertaken by the RSA, instead of generating support created violent opposition.⁶⁰ Riots and work stoppages broke out throughout the country, which disrupted the already fragile South African economy.⁶¹ The RSA responded by declaring a state of emergency. The violent crackdown that ensued led to a number of abuses and illegal actions by elements of the state that were more and more inclined to use extreme measures in an attempt to reestablish control. Violence spiraled out of control in the townships and black supporters of the government were targeted and killed in large numbers by an angry black public.⁶² The Government's brutal response generated international media attention and sympathy for the insurgents. Paradoxically, because of its success in isolating the population from external resistance movements this violence was in many cases self-generating. The opposition movements were refitting and reorganizing abroad after the RSA's successful military operations and could provide little direct coordination for these opposition efforts.⁶³ This upswing in violence was a tipping point for international opposition and led to wholesale economic divesture in South African industries by the nation's largest trading partners. The resulting economic

60 In 1983 the RSA granted a role in governance to citizens of Indian and mixed race by the creation of separate houses of parliament. These reforms while a first in terms of power sharing between whites and non-whites excluded the majority black population and were deemed as illegitimate. Clayton, *Frontiersmen*, 131 and Alan Cowell, *Killing the Wizards: Wars of Power and Freedom from Zaire to South Africa* (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1992), 163.

61 Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 178-179. Colin Legum, *Battlefronts of Southern Africa* (New York: Africana, 1988), 425-438 has detailed description of the role of sanctions on the economy and political decisions of the RSA.

62 Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 163-164, and 197. Cowell describes on page 197 how the targeting of the 18,000 black members of the security forces created a sense of lawlessness and lack of government control.

63 Kevin O'Brien, "A blunted spear: the failure of the African National Congress/South African Communist Party revolutionary war strategy 1961-1990" *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, (Volume 14, Number 2, June 2003):55.

damage reduced the strategic effectiveness of economic coercion by the South Africans. The resulting economic disruptions fueled further opposition to the RSA policies within the black working class and the white business community.⁶⁴ Under increased pressure to reduce the cost of the conflict in terms of capital and commitment of white conscripts, the RSA redoubled its military efforts in Angola and Namibia to try to obtain a political solution through military actions. By increasing the cost economically and militarily to support SWAPO and the ANC the RSA tried to bring about a political solution to the conflict. Where economic coercion and diplomacy had faltered, additional military actions would end the stalemate abroad. This approach was successful in decreasing Soviet and Cuban support for Angola as well as Angolan support for SWAPO. In exchange for Angolan forces ceasing support to SWAPO, the RSA would withdraw its forces from Angolan territory. To hedge its position, the RSA continued to support its proxy in Angola, UNITA, in order to keep Angolan and SWAPO forces occupied and incapable of influencing events in Namibia. The withdrawal was only temporary however as South Africa intervened again in 1987 to defeat a combined Cuban and Angolan offensive against UNITA. The intervention led to some of the largest battles on the continent of Africa since the Second World War around the southern Angola city of Cuito Canavalle.⁶⁵ The implications of the Cuito Canavalle campaign were significant for the RSA strategy and will be discussed in more detail later in this paper. The end of the campaign around Cuito Canavalle left both sides weakened and in the mood to once again try to achieve a negotiated settlement.⁶⁶ A series of

64 Colin Legum, *Battlefronts of Southern Africa*, 334.

65 The best account of the campaign and its strategic contexts are Fred Bridgland, *The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent* (Gibraltar: Ashanti, 1990) and Helmoed-Römer Hetiman, *War in Angola: The Final South African Phase* (Gibraltar: Ashanti Press, 1990).

66 Fred Bridgland, *War for Africa*, 320,372.

agreements eventually led to a withdrawal of both South African and Cuban forces from Angola in exchange for each side agreeing to limit future operations and support for opposition groups. This in turn set the condition for elections in Namibia under international auspices in 1989. SWAPO, in a poor strategic decision, violated the cease-fire agreement and initiated a military offensive to infiltrate additional forces to influence the election. This gave the RSA a reason to intervene militarily without great risk of international condemnation.⁶⁷ The resulting RSA operations disrupted and damaged SWAPO's military and political infrastructure at a critical time. The South African political and military leadership weakened by internal discord at home were unable to fully exploit this opportunity but achieved the overall goal of preventing SWAPO domination of the election process. Many in the region considered the fact that SWAPO, despite winning the elections, was unable to obtain a sufficient majority to implement a Marxist style government in the newly independent Namibia as a victory for South Africa.⁶⁸

The success in Namibia came too late to aid in efforts within South Africa itself. The political situation in the RSA had undergone a seismic shift in the period from 1986 to 1989 culminating in the abandonment of the Total Strategy and the eventual end of Apartheid. South Africa transitioned to majority rule under the ANC and President Nelson Mandela.⁶⁹ The South Africans had achieved their military objectives in both Angola and Namibia but the unrest at home, international pressure for the repeal of apartheid, and subsequent economic ostracism prevented the RSA from achieving a lasting peace. Instead of implementing reforms from a

67 Dr. Leopold Scholtz, "The Namibian Border War: An Appraisal of the South African Strategy" *Scientia Militaria* (Vol34 No. 2006) :45-46.

68 Scholtz, "Namibian Border War": 48, and Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 34-35.

69 Eric Louw, *The Rise, Fall and Legacy of Apartheid* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004).

position of strength, the RSA had to more and more fight for control within its own borders and even for support from its once supportive white population. The resulting opposition and instability that began in 1983 prevented the RSA from obtaining support at home for necessary tactical and operational actions abroad. The government inability to convince either its domestic audience (both black and white) or the international community to accept the continued minority rule undercut all the tactical and operational successes of the campaign. By 1989 the military gains of earlier were insufficient to maintain the white minority regime in power. This critical failure to maintain international and home front support proved to be the decisive failure for South Africa strategy. Tactical and operational military successes were insufficient to obtain the RSA's strategic goals. The South African experience is strong evidence in support of McCuen's conceptualization of hybrid war and the need to win the conventional, irregular, and informational battles simultaneously. A more thorough examination of how the RSA tried to link its operations at all three levels will provide additional insight into the challenges inherent in planning and conducting hybrid wars while further explaining/expanding our understanding of the term.

Foundations of South Africa Strategy

Strategic thinking and planning are a vital component of setting the conditions of success in hybrid war. McCuen argues that strategic planning for hybrid war is based upon a realization that conventional and irregular wars are "interrelated parts of the same war. [Leaders] must change our military and political culture to perceive, plan, and wage them that way."⁷⁰ From 1978 to 1989, South African policy attempted to achieve just such a linkage. As previously discussed,

70 John McCuen, "Art of Hybrid War", Unpublished Manuscript 30 July 2007, 14.

the RSA responded to the changing geopolitical situation by adopting the concept of Total Strategy to synchronize and guide their actions. The goal of Total Strategy was to maintain white governance through force, physical and economic coercion, and measured reforms.⁷¹ The theory of Total Strategy originated in the writings of French Military theorist General Andre Beaufre. Beaufre, a veteran of the French campaigns in Algeria and Indochina, developed a concept of strategic thinking that sought to apply French thinking on counter revolutionary warfare in the broader context of the Cold War. Beaufre emphasized the psychological and political struggle over military action.⁷² For him “insurgency wars were fundamentally battles of will, or psychological battles-the first side to psychological surrender lost the war.”⁷³ Winning that psychological battle, Beaufre argued, required a mix of direct and indirect actions unified around a centralized government response called the Total Strategy. He envisioned Total Strategy as being under the direct control of the highest levels of government, “... Total Strategy[’s task is to] define how total war is to be conducted...to lay down the object for each specialized category of strategy and the manner in which all-political, economic, diplomatic, and military –should be woven in together”⁷⁴ Beaufre was clearly advocating a whole of government approach in both strategy formulation and implementation. The RSA took Beaufre to heart in developing both its strategy and the structures to carry it forward.

71 Republic of South Africa, *White Paper on Defence*, 1977. 8. The White Paper expressed the national objectives as nothing less “the continued existence of the RSA and all its people by ...orderly development, identification, prevention, and countering of revolution, subversion and any other form of unconstitutional action...”

72 Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, 24. “The art of strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means and so orchestrating their results that they combine to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required.”

73 Louw, *Legacy of Apartheid*,91.

74 Beaufre, *Introduction to Strategy*, 30.

In the 1977 *White Paper on Defence*, the South African leadership drew almost word from word from Beaufre's writings in creating their own Total Strategy.⁷⁵ Under the RSA model, Total Strategy was required "In response to the perceived "total onslaught" by black nationalists inspired and controlled by international communism." The South Africa strategic narrative was predicated upon a worldview that believed "black political power was the equivalent of Communist control of South Africa, and thus the defense of Apartheid was the defense of the West in Africa."⁷⁶ Such a worldview lent itself to seeing the conflict in absolutes and justified a wholesale commitment of resources to ensure the survival of the state. This view also justified and enabled the RSA to adopt a whole of government approach to oversee a national mobilization in all areas. As the whitepaper explained, the "total national strategy... can perhaps be described as the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to the states according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims."⁷⁷ The South African policy makers realized that victory in their conflict would require an expansion of the conflict and the resources dedicated to winning. The 1977 White Paper stated, "the resolution for a conflict in the times we now live demands interdependent and coordinated action in all fields, military, psychological,

75 The RSA combined Beaufre with the works of Samuel Huntington and the Counter Insurgency theories of John McCuen and Robert Thompson to develop an integrated approach to counterrevolution at the national level. See Kevin A. O'Brien, "Special Forces for Counter Revolutionary Warfare: the South African Case" *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (January 2001:279-109). The RSA's acceptance and use of McCuen's earlier counter /organization arguments is vital to understand how the RSA case study conforms to McCuen's later writings on hybrid war. McCuen's conceptualization of success in hybrid war is drawn directly from theories first presented in his *Art of Counter Revolutionary War*. See McCuen, "Art of Hybrid War," 10-11 and his discussion of counter /organization in Vietnam pages 33-36, 48-55.

76 Metz, "Pretoria Total Strategy": 439.

77 RSA, White paper, 5. "A total national strategy is therefore not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure

economic, political, sociological, technological, diplomatic, ideological, cultural, etc.”⁷⁸ Total Strategy thus placed heavy emphasis on winning in the psychological dimension of combat.⁷⁹ This explicit acknowledgment of the necessarily linkage of these multiple fields in a coordinated manner to bring about a psychological impact is what separates hybrid war from other strategies. The intrinsic recognition that actions should be evaluated in terms of how they influence the decisive populations in the contested country and at home , is central to development of an effective hybrid war strategy.⁸⁰ As the RSA experience will show merely having an effective strategy does not equate to carrying it through to success.

The adoption of Total Strategy was controversial both within and outside South Africa. The RSA leadership felt that such a restructuring of government strategy was necessary to manage South Africa’s limited resources especially in light of the international arms boycotts and embargoes imposed on the RSA. South African strategic thought shifted the burden from purely a military solution towards a national mobilization. As the 1977 White Paper made abundantly clear:

“The Defence of the RSA is not solely the responsibility of the Department of Defence. On the contrary, the maintenance of the sovereignty ...is the combined responsibility of all government departments. ... It is the responsibility of the entire population, the nation, and every population group. The Department of defence is merely an executive body responsible for the achievement of certain national security goals as directed by the Government”⁸¹

78 RSA, White paper, 4.

79 Lowe, *Legacy of Apartheid*, 91-92.

80 As McCuen observes, “Art of Hybrid War”, 82. “...all military operations, at whatever stage in a hybrid war, must be oriented on the population objectives.”

81 RSA, White paper, 4.

Under this construct, the nation was involved in a total war along ideological and cultural identities

In its attempt to manage limited resources, South Africa took the concept of unity of effort to extremes, and military officers came to dominate the government's deliberations.⁸² The militarization of South African policy only increased as domestic opposition increased. The popular perception was that the military and not the civil authority was dictating policy. The blurring of military and civilian roles lead to labeling of these planners as "securocrats" - a neologism for defense minded technocrats. Over time, these securocrats became so fixated on anti-communism that many subverted the democratic process in the RSA.⁸³ This perception undermined the RSA's credibility with its domestic population (both white and black) and the international community. The RSA strategic narrative, left little room for compromise in domestic affairs and justified extreme measures in the minds of many South Africans.⁸⁴ As will later be shown in the discussion of South African information operations, this had lasting impacts on the RSA struggle for public perceptions and international legitimacy.⁸⁵

82 David Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa :Perspectives on Southern Africa* (Los Angeles :University of California Press,1988),268. Harrison quotes the Chief of Operations Lieutenant General Dutton, " Total Strategy would appear to favor a system of unified command. ...conventional organizations in a democratic system do not as a rule lend themselves to those procedures. Therefore organizational changes or adaptations would appear to be imperative."

83 The TRC is full of accounts of individuals who conducted illegal actions with and without government support because of this willingness to see things in the extreme. Ironically later in the campaign, it would be the securocrats in the military who would argue for drastic social reforms as a means of military success

84 Harrison, *White Tribe* , 267. The mentality was one of you are with us or against us. Harrison quotes one South African officer as staying "What then is total war all about? In effect every means of a state and community or society becomes a weapons; every capability in whatever field of Endeavour at the disposal of an enemy becomes a target."

85 One critic argues that this slippery slope was inherent in the origins of counter revolutionary theory. "The theoretical framework of these embittered officers rested on the fact that the communist Viet Minh in Indo-China had linked inextricably all military operations to political, social, psychological and especially ideological elements. It was therefore essential to create an extended military battlefield that included all aspects of civil society, especially the

South African information operations and strategic assumptions were based on the belief that internal opposition and calls for majority rule were the not the result of legitimate grievances but were caused by manipulation by outside agitators. As one author explained, “Total Strategy did not see South Africa and its restive, black majority in isolation from the rest of the continent. Rather it represented an all encompassing concept of political and military management that sought to deal with domestic problems within a safe cocoon created by the neutralization of threats from beyond the frontiers.”⁸⁶ The theory held that if South Africa could isolate its domestic population from external agitation, it could then conduct reforms on its own terms. The reforms would achieve a political compromise that left whites in position of power in exchange for increased economic benefits and limited role in government for other races. This idea was derived from Beaufre’s observation that, “The concept of strategic action necessarily stems from political analysis. By thorough going reforms we must cut the ground out from under the malcontents.”⁸⁷ The RSA’s leadership saw their challenge to be determining when and how to arrange diverse military and non-military efforts to create conditions to allow those reforms. Before the state could implement those reforms, it would seek to set the conditions through its conventional and irregular military operations.

social and ideological spheres. ...by adopting the enemy's "own" methods and turning them against the enemy. Hence the coming into being of a strategy political misperceptions with a sophisticated array of psychological warfare techniques.” Stan Winer, “Ghosts of the Past” http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/articles_papers/TRC-ghosts-winer.htm(Accessed 23 December 2008).

86 Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 86. Under the Afrikaner mindset there was always a need to control the black population in order to preserve Afrikaner separateness. The military was dominated by Afrikaner elite but was distinct from more conservative Afrikaner elements in that they were willing to reform and work towards acceptance by the population of those reforms. This division between conservatives and reformers within RSA government led to debate over the timing, nature and style of reforms to implement.

87 Andre Beaufre quoted in Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 90.

Winning Symmetric Battles-Conventional Operations

The South Africa conventional forces were qualitatively the best on the African continent.⁸⁸ Yet under the strategic framework of Total Strategy, conventional operations would not be decisive. Instead, they would be employed in conjunction with other military and social efforts as part of wide-ranging strategy to set conditions for successful counter insurgency efforts. In US military doctrine, RSA conventional operations were shaping operations.⁸⁹ Conventional operations were vital in that that enabled freedom of action and gave the RSA strategic and operational initiative while further deterring overt invasion by other nations. This was clearly expressed by the South African Commander in Namibia when he said, “Our operations in Southern Angola are merely a tactic to achieve our aim, which is not to clean up Angola, but to keep South West Africa [Namibia] clean.”⁹⁰ Conventional military attacks in Angola were meant to enable political and counterinsurgency success in Namibia by disrupting communist support for the insurgency, denying safe havens, and providing a secure environment to conduct civic

88. The South African military was divided between a small standing army and a conscript force. Local reserves were organized following irregular warfare tradition dating back to the Boer Commandos and their irregular campaign against the British and Native African. This style of warfare coexisted with the South African conventional forces. The RSA had operational experience in the Second World War and Korea fighting as part of the British commonwealth from which the RSA adapted British doctrine and force structures for its conventional forces. By the late 1970's, reserve forces were still organized along traditional local commando groups. The bulk of other units were made up of a small pool of professional officers and soldiers called the Permanent Force augmented by short duration conscripts (National Servicemen). This created additional tension within a force already divided by Afrikaner or British cultural heritages.

89 Field Manual 3.0 *Operations*, 4-23. “Shaping operations at any echelon create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Shaping operations include lethal and nonlethal activities conducted throughout the AO”

90 Quoted in David V. Nowlin, and Ronald J Stupak, *War as an Instrument of Policy : Past, Present and Future*(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998),149.

action and mobilization within the Namibian population.⁹¹ This integrated approach to conventional operations is in keeping with McCuen's model of hybrid war.⁹²

Over the course of the campaign, South African conventional operations evolved from cross border hot pursuits of guerillas to sanctuary denial missions to full-scale maneuver battles against Communist mechanized forces. From the period of 1976 to 1989, the RSA launched over sixteen conventional operations primarily against Angola, but South Africa fought in Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zaire and Zambia as well.⁹³ Initially the RSA conventional forces sought to avoid contact with host nation forces in order to focus efforts on insurgent base camps. Varying in size from company to brigade sized ground units augmented by close air support and helicopters, "these 'sanctuary-denial' operations amounted to raids in force. They emphasized shock, surprise, aggressive advance, intelligence and maximum disruption of the [enemy] forces engaged."⁹⁴ Success of these operations had the consequence of driving the ANC and SWAPO to co-locate with host nation forces and their Communist allies and advisors.⁹⁵ This symbiotic relationship between insurgent and host nation foreshadowed many of the tactics employed by insurgencies today in Afghanistan and Lebanon. In order to attack the insurgents the South

⁹¹ For a detailed discussion of how RSA linked operations in Namibia to counterinsurgency operations see McWilliams, "No More Sanctuaries".

⁹² McCuen, "Hybrid War": 112. "We will need to adopt a more holistic attitude to war, approaching the various battlegrounds as one battle-ground. Clearly, the conventional aim of defeating the enemy's combat forces has to be achieved at each stage in the campaign. But the decisive second and third objectives, predicated on the populations, must also be achieved"

⁹³ Johnson, "In the Middle of the Fight.", 73.

⁹⁴ Robert Owen, "Counter Revolution in Namibia" *Airpower Journal* (Winter 1987-88), <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj87/win87-88.html>. Owen is specially discussing operations against SWAPO but the tactics were applied against the ANC.

Africans were often forced to engage both host nation military forces and civilian populations who were providing both a shield and a source of support for the opposition movements.

In response to RSA actions SWAPO shifted both force structure and tactics. SWAPO operated as small squad size forces, guerilla battalions, mechanized light infantry, and individual terrorist cells.⁹⁶ SWAPO made effective use of mines, advanced air defense systems, and host nation military assets to increase the risk of casualties to South African forces. As the likelihood of direct contact with Angolan forces and Communist Advisors increased, the decision-making authority for South African operations in Angola moved from the tactical commanders to the national command level.⁹⁷ The fact that the bulk of South African forces were short duration conscripts made the Nation very casualty averse.⁹⁸ South Africa went to great lengths to reduce casualties within its conscript force, and to manage the information leaving the combat zone.⁹⁹

95 Legum, *Battlefronts of Southern Africa*, 314. In Angola SWAPO, forces in exchange for continued support were often integrated into Angola (MPLA) and Cuban forces for actions against UNITA. Some estimates indicate that half of all SWAPO guerillas were engaged in fighting UNITA in exchange for communist support.

96 A non-state actor's ability to change structure and employ advanced technology has been proposed as the distinguishing feature of hybrid warfare. As such, much of hybrid war literature has fixated on this capability. The claims that Hezbollah was unique in this ability and thus constituted a revolution in thinking about hybrid war needs to be reevaluated. An Order of Battle of SWAPO is found in Kelly Bell, "Cold War Campaign: South Africa in Angola." *Strategy and Tactics* , No 235(June 2006): 1920.

97 RSA command and control was less hierarchical then modern American operations. The Chief of Staff of the SADF would visit and provide direct guidance to units in the field.

98 Annette Seegers, *Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, 239. She contends that a "Conventional conflict exposed the SADF's most conspicuous military vulnerability; white military casualties spelled political disaster."

99 Bernard Trainor, "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role" *New York Times*, July 12, 1988. "The South African military leadership is very sensitive to casualties, black and white, and all operations are calculated to minimize losses; some Afrikaners ,upset over white casualties, have questioned the South African role in Angola"

Most South African citizens knew little about these operations.¹⁰⁰ This limited some of the strategic choices available to the South African leadership. When coupled with shortages of specialized equipment caused by arms and economic embargoes it created reluctance on the part of the RSA to commit conventional forces unless they could achieve clear-cut goals and depart with limited loss of life and equipment. South Africa was thus forced to modify its expectations of success when confronted by a threat that could employ the tactics of hybrid warfare.¹⁰¹


A closer examination of two specific South African operations highlights the difficulty of balancing the diverse needs of a hybrid war strategy. Emblematic of the early South African conventional operations was Operation Reindeer. Launched on May 4, 1978, Operation Reindeer consisted of an airborne assault of SWAPO's operational headquarters deep in Angolan territory, and a simultaneous mechanized ground offensive supported by South African Special Forces and UNITA allies against insurgent camps closer to the Namibian border.¹⁰² The parachute assault on Cassinga forced the RSA to assume considerable risk as the main objective was over 250 kilometers inside Angolan territory and defended by substantial SWAPO and Cuban forces that could easily overwhelm the airborne units. The raid was a clear tactical success for the RSA who killed eight hundred SWAPO guerillas at the cost of six dead and thirty-four wounded South

100 Clive Holt, *At Thy Call We Did not Falter*. (Johannesburg: Zebra Press, 2003) 15, 40. Holt a veteran of the 1987 campaign provides a perspective on how the RSA controlled the information about casualties and intentionally mislead soldiers who to their surprise found themselves fighting in Angola.

101 McCuen, "Art of Hybrid War": 9. McCuen describes how a hybrid opponent can employ the tactics of "mass and disperse", "safe haven" and "major ally" to protract the war to achieve their goals.

102 For two diverse views of the Operation, see Steenkampf, *Border: South Africa into Angola* (Durban, South Africa: Butterworth's, 1983), 08, 134-140 and TRC, Vol 2, 46-54., the TRC concludes "Operation Reindeer was a violation of the territorial Sovereignty of the republic of Angola and that it resulted in the commission of Gross human rights violations against the civilian occupants of the Cassinga Camp."

Africans.¹⁰³ However, in a clear demonstration of the complexity of hybrid war, the RSA tactical and operational success was undercut by their adversary's information campaign. Widespread media reports labeled the attack as a massacre of unarmed refugees¹⁰⁴ The RSA had hoped to achieve both a physical disruption as well as a psychological disruption by showing that the RSA was willing to strike deep into Angolan territory. Instead of capitalizing on the initiative and momentum from the raid, the RSA was forced to defend itself against accusations of human rights abuse and massacring of unarmed civilians actions. The Namibian portrayal of the attack as a massacre perpetrated by the militaristic and racist South Africans was widely believed and reported in the media.¹⁰⁵ This highlights the decisive nature of information operations in hybrid war. The need to anticipate how an enemy can exploit actions for information advantage needs to be incorporated into initial planning. The RSA would continue to have difficulty turning tactical success into information advantage throughout its campaign.¹⁰⁶ In many cases, the RSA would just commit more resources in an attempt to change the strategic situation. The commitment of




the attacks is remembered as a national holiday in Namibia. The truth and reconciliation belief that it was a gross violation of human rights was widely accepted and reproduced in Western media.

¹⁰⁶ Similar paradoxes are evident in Israeli actions in Lebanon and in Gaza. Each action by the Israelis was countered by their opponents' media operations, which sought to depict each Israeli action in the worst possible context to an international audience. For a tactical summary of Operation Reindeer, see Johnson, *In the Middle of the Fight*, 76-79, and Steenkamp, *Borderstrike*, 47-95.

Angola 1

Figure 2: Conventional Battlefields



Source: Nowlin, David V. and Stupak, Ronald J. *War as an Instrument of Policy: Past, Present and Future*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998.

The largest conventional engagement of the South African campaign, and one indicative of the role of conventional warfare in McCuen's hybrid war model was the battle of Cuito Canavale. Fought from September 1987 to March 1988, the campaign shifted from irregular warfare, to conventional warfare, to a combination of the two, and then back to a primarily conventional siege¹⁰⁷ The RSA involvement began as an attempt to relieve pressure on UNITA forces caused by the largest combined Angola Cuban offensive to date.¹⁰⁸ The RSA committed

¹⁰⁷ Often referred to as one battle, the South African efforts around Cuito Canavale are best understood as a campaign. The major South African operations were Operation Moduler and Hooper. For an overview of the campaign as a whole see Fred Bridgland, *War for Africa*, for the South African operational level perspective see Heitman, Helmoed-Römer. *War in Angola: The Final South African Phase*. (Gibraltar: Ashanti Press, 1990)

¹⁰⁸ The Angolan offensive was planned and controlled by Soviet Advisors who wanted to achieve a decisive and final destruction of UNITA in South Eastern Angola by the use of overwhelming military power.

approximately ten thousand South African troops in support of its UNITA ally against upwards of forty thousand Cuban and Angola troops. RSA mechanized units destroyed Cuban and Angolan armored columns while South African Special Forces tied down SWAPO and Cuban reserves.¹⁰⁹ UNITA forces augmented by RSA advisors and artillery supported the main effort and provided critical infantry forces for the assault. In terms of statistical losses and operational effects the battle seems clearly to have been a victory for South Africa. The combined Angolan Cuban offensive against UNITA was halted and communist forces suffered high casualties in men and equipment for little loss on life by the South Africans. However, the Angolan and Cubans were able to claim victory because though they had not won militarily, they were able to survive to continue the conflict and obtain considerable informational advantages.¹¹⁰ This paradox is in keeping with McCuen's hybrid war paradigm where conventional successes without accompanying information success do not achieve a decisive effect.

The fact that the Angolans and the Cubans held Cuito Canavalle, regardless of whether the RSA actually wanted to occupy the town was portrayed as a communist victory. The repulse of South African attacks and the subsequent statement was seen as a loss of prestige for the RSA.¹¹¹ Cuban and Angola information operations downplayed their own losses. Nelson Mandela later remarked that, "The decisive defeat of the racist army in Cuito Canavalle was a

¹⁰⁹ Helmoed-Römer Heitman. *The South African War Machine* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), and Norval, *Death in the Desert*, 215-226. For the UW operations in this phase see Piet Nortje, 32 Battalion *The Inside Story of South Africa's Elite Fighting Unit* (Capetown, South Africa: Zebra Press, 2004), 221-255.

¹¹⁰ This was repeated by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War- "Hezbollah claimed that by merely surviving, it gained symbolic victory over the more powerful Israeli army", CRS Report for Congress, *Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict*, 29.

¹¹¹ On the issue of prestige see Seegers, *Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, 258 and Bernard Trainor, "South Africans Lose a Reputation for Invincibility", *New York Times*, August 24, 1988.

victory for all Africa.”¹¹² The view that Cuito Canavalle was ‘Apartheid’s Stalingrad’ was repeated so often in the press that it became the accepted truth.¹¹³ South Africa information operations could not overcome this perception and influence world opinion. Its press representatives often reverted to an attrition-based approach to explain its successes to domestic and international audiences.¹¹⁴ Other hybrid opponents have had similar success with using media coverage to negate physical realities of the conventional battlefield losses, most notably Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War.¹¹⁵ By the skillful use of media and the ability to protract the struggle, the Angolans and Cubans were employing a hybrid war strategy.¹¹⁶ As McCuen notes, “Our enemies have learned that in hybrid war, protraction wins, especially with its trenchantly modern, technology-enabled impact on spectator populations. Both the insurgent’s conventional and information operations are designed to protract the war and gain outside support, thereby wearing down their enemies.”¹¹⁷

¹¹² Nelson Mandela, Address at the Cuban National Cuba, July 26 1991, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1991/19910726-1.html>. He continued :“The decisive defeat of the aggressive apartheid forces destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor.”

¹¹³ Bridgland, *War for Africa*, 368.

¹¹⁴ Norwal, *Death in the Desert*, 226. He quotes the South African commander Colonel Ferria's interpretation of the battle. “ If defeat for South Africa meant the loss of 31 men, three tanks, five armored vehicles, and three aircraft, then we’d lost. If victory for FAPLA and the Cubans meant the loss of 4600 men, 94 tanks, 100 armored vehicles, 9 aircraft and other Soviet equipment valued at more than a billion rand, then they’d won.”

¹¹⁵ Congressional Research Service, Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, 29.

¹¹⁶ Sarah E. Kreps, “The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned”, *Parameters*, (Spring 2007).82-83. “Given the way opponents use casualties as political theater for generating support, the use of military force, which inevitably leads to casualties, will likely only invigorate a resistance that is founded more on an ideology than on the material power that fuels conventional militaries. Since the opposition is as much ideological as military, then it is not clear that only the use of force... will itself bring the adversary to its knees. Rather, the use of force should be integrated within a broader political strategy designed to collapse support for the adversary”

¹¹⁷ McCuen, “Art of Hybrid War”, 109.

The stalled situation around Cuito Canavalle forced a decision on the part of the RSA. To complete the destruction of Angolan and Cuban troops in Cuito Canavalle the RSA would have to increase its financial commitment and forces in Southern Angola. This in turn would increase the likelihood of RSA casualties was politically unacceptable. As Alan Cowell explains, “support for a black ally could not and would not be financed by white South African casualties beyond a low threshold because white opinion at home would not tolerate it.”¹¹⁸ If the RSA leadership was unwilling to increase its troop commitment RSA would have to settle for the damage they had inflicted on their opponents and the limited territorial gains they and UNITA had made up to this point. An air raid by Cuban fighter-bombers that killed twelve RSA conscripts in 1988 had a galvanizing effect on RSA opinion makers.¹¹⁹ The South African leadership chose to withdraw its forces.

Despite the uncertain victory at Cuito Canavalle, the RSA was still able to use the battle to achieve a strategic goal of a timeline for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola. As one South African author explained by 1988, the RSA believed that its military actions had “managed to bring about a total change of both the strategic and political situation...by the carefully controlled application of limited force....a small force operating under very close political control achieved the political end that had eluded the diplomats for years.”¹²⁰ This statement was only partial correct and reveals a flaw in the RSA strategy. Under McCuen’s paradigm separate battles

118 Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 109.

119 Clayton, *Frontiersmen*, 139, and Seegers, *Military in the Making*, 260. The air attack also shows how a hybrid opponent uses specific technological advantages (aircraft in this case) to achieve a significant impact on the opponent by generating casualties and media coverage. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Hezbollah in Israel have used similar high profile attacks.

120 Heitman, *War in Angola*, 347.

cannot be evaluated in isolation. While Military operations had lessened pressure on the border, they not facilitated any change with domestic support and discontent in South Africa itself.¹²¹

The difficulty in turning conventional actions into strategic success is a reoccurring challenge in hybrid wars. Success in conventional operations in hybrid war is thus necessary but insufficient to obtain strategic goals. Conventional victories not supported by population victories do not prevent the enemy from obtaining support and thus their political goals in the target population centers. Thus the paradox of winning the battles but still losing the war reappears. The implication is that conventional military operations must be sufficient to convince the opponent you are fighting, his supporters, and a neutral public that they were actually defeated. The means employed in these operations must be such that it does not allow claims of abuse or disproportional violence. Too much force and you are perceived as oppressive, too little force you are perceived as weak. The operations at Cassinga and Cuito Canavalle reveal the difficulty of conventional operations in a hybrid war. At Cassinga, tactical success was recast as South African abuse, whereas the South African inability to obtain to occupy the town of Cuito Canavalle was portrayed as weakness.¹²² Such a balancing act is difficult to say the least. The RSA had more success in linking military operations to information success in its Counterinsurgency campaign in Namibia.

121 The fact that this disproved the RSA's assumption that isolation of its population would lead to success at home was not apparent to RSA planners.

122 Bernard Trainor, "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role." *New York Times*, July 12, 1988.

Winning Asymmetric battles – COIN Operations

South African COIN operations in Namibia have been described as “the only case of a clear cut victory by security forces ...against a communist backed insurgency with considerable foreign support based in supposedly invulnerable positions.”¹²³ Through a well-structured COIN and information strategy, the RSA was able to simultaneously achieve the goals of a hybrid war strategy by defeating the enemy military force, obtaining support (or neutrality) from the target population, home front and international community.¹²⁴ Settlement in Namibia was predicated upon repeal of most apartheid laws and accepting the compromise of an independent Namibian government with SWAPO in power but incapable of absolute rule. The RSA achieved success by focusing its efforts on critical target populations, maintaining, and mobilizing support for those objectives.

This counter-mobilization and organization are the second components of a successful hybrid war strategy. Counter organization focuses on the target population and employs a combination of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare tactics to deny the opponent “the opportunities and conditions to establish [and sustain] their movement.”¹²⁵ South Africa had to conduct operations in three separate locations: Angola, Namibia, and at home. While South Africa conducted traditional COIN in Namibia, it conducted a mix of COIN and irregular warfare in both Angola and Mozambique.¹²⁶ Both efforts in turn influenced South African domestic

¹²³ Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 34.

¹²⁴ McCuen, “Art of Hybrid War”: 80-83.

¹²⁵ John J. McCuen, *Art of Counterrevolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency*, (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer, 1996), 285.

¹²⁶ The distinction between COIN and Irregular warfare in this case is from the RSA viewpoint. The distinction is that RSA used conventional organized and uniformed forces for COIN whereas it used Special Forces and indigenous forces for IW. Current US doctrine does not rely on this distinction.

antiterrorism and civic support operations.¹²⁷ South African counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine evolved over time but were primarily focused on winning hearts and minds (WHAM) while simultaneously isolating the population from external influences. This approach was seen as consistent with the overall goals of Total Strategy. The official South African COIN manual stated, “Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the military forces, the chance of success is greatly reduced. If the people support the government and the military forces, the enemy becomes isolated and cut off from its supplies, shelter and intelligence.”¹²⁸ Much of the origins of this thinking can be traced to the earlier writings of John McCuen. McCuen’s concept of hybrid war maintains the same focus on mobilizing the population at the lowest level to create an environment conducive to military and information operations. In hybrid war, he writes, “Stability and success can only be won by counter-organizing the combat country from the bottom, up, not from the top, down. Emphasis must be laid on self-government and self-defense established at the population level, integrating, so far as possible, the diverse composition of the population. If stability can be achieved at this level, it can subsequently be achieved, layer by layer, regionally and nationally.”¹²⁹ The RSA was clearly trying to implement some of McCuen's key concepts of hybrid war in their COIN efforts.

The question of legitimacy dominated the issue in Namibia. South African ruled Namibia under an expired League of Nations mandate which the international community

127 RSA doctrine was based on among others McCuen’s *Art of Counter Revolutionary War* and Sir Robert Thompson and drew from senior officer’s experience and military education. Magnus Malan the Chief of the SADF graduated from US Command and General Staff College and served in Algeria. Eric Louw, *Legacy of Apartheid*, 100-103.

128 Scholtz, “Namibian Border War”: 40-41

129 McCuen, “Art of Hybrid War”: 82.

declared as an as an illegal colonial occupation in. International support became a critical source of strength and legitimacy for SWAPO. The United Nations had recognized SWAPO as "a national liberation movement" and the "authentic representative of the Namibian people" and declared the RSA's control of Namibia as illegal.¹³⁰ The RSA could do little to overcome international opposition to their continued presence in Namibia, as they needed to maintain Namibia as a border state after Angola became communist. In response to increased SWAPO operations, the RSA transferred responsibility for security from the South African Police to the SADF who almost immediately, began planning for long duration security operations.¹³¹ Initial SADF efforts focused on intelligence gathering, securing the border, and tracking and pursuing of SWAPO infiltrators. South African intelligence identified a number of large SWAPO and ANC training camps in Angolan territory where Angolan, Cuban, and other Soviet Block advisors were providing arms and training to insurgents. By 1978, the SADF estimated SWAPO had up to 14,000-armed supporters operating from these sanctuaries in Angola. Like later hybrid opponents, SWAPO was able to change its structure and organization in response to South African actions, effectively moving from terrorist cells, to guerilla companies, to mechanized formations.¹³² This transition was made easier by extensive air support, electronic warfare assets, and intelligence provided by Angolan forces and Soviet bloc advisors. SWAPO the ANC and the Angolans were equipped with sophisticated weaponry to include the most advanced man portable air defense weapons (MANPADS) then in the Soviet inventory. The heavy involvement and material support

130 Nowlin and Stupak, *War as Instrument*, 144.

131 John Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 36-39.

132 In many ways, SWAPO's ability to change its force structure was identical to Hezbollah in the Lebanon campaign. This is further evidence of hybrid and opponents and warfare taking place earlier than many technological based models of hybrid war would acknowledge.

of communist forces allowed the RSA to portray the conflict in terms of communist/anticommunist rhetoric. The equating of SWAPO to radical communism allowed the RSA to gain support amongst domestic and international audiences.¹³³ As Scholtz explains, “SWAPO’s avowed aspiration to convert Namibia into a Marxist one party state ...enabl[ed] Pretoria, ironically enough, to present the conflict in rather more respectable cloak of communist dictatorship versus liberal multiparty democracy.”¹³⁴ It helped the South Africans immensely when SWAPO leadership increasingly became more radicalized and openly communist in rhetoric and actions.¹³⁵ South African information operations capitalized on this to create internal discord amongst SWAPO membership. Unlike in its conventional operations, the RSA maintained the information initiative during its operations in Namibia.

The ability to portray the conflict in terms of anti-communism gave the RSA needed political legitimacy with its domestic white audience to conduct operations in Namibia and Angola. However, as the conflict dragged on the RSA carefully controlled information coming in and out of the conflict zone to shape domestic opinion. As Dr. Leopold Scholtz explains, South African officials realized that “the war became an attempt to win enough time to create the conditions in which SWAPO would lose an election.”¹³⁶ South Africa was successful in its information campaign targeting domestic Namibian population. As Annette Seegers explains, the

133 Norval, *Death in the Desert*. To advance their narrative of the Total Onslaught of communism the South Africans frequently displayed captured documents and orders written by Communist advisors.. Captured classrooms full of Communist propaganda became a staple of South African news conferences. The capture of a Soviet Advisor was a propaganda coup for the South Africans-

134 Scholtz, “Namibian Border War”: 40-41

135 Steenkampf, *Border Strike*, 9. SWAPO’s leader, Sam Nujoma, went on record saying that upon victory: “the people would do away ‘with a variety of traitors’ ... and puppets.”

136 Scholtz, “Namibian Border War”: 33.

South African information strategy was based on the premise that “the provision of benefits brings legitimacy”¹³⁷ South Africa by providing economic and security benefits would be seen as the best or most legitimate option. South African information operations highlighted civic actions and the improvements in day-to-day security and quality of life to convince the population to reject SWAPO. Political reforms were implemented in Namibia to include repeal of much of the apartheid policies still in force in the RSA itself. These reforms may be attributed to the military exigencies but more likely was the result of awareness by the military commander that apartheid was undermining popular and international support.¹³⁸ The focus on population security was also in keeping with McCuen’s prescription for counter organization and hybrid war success. South African pressure also forced SWAPO to disperse into smaller groups and resort to terrorist tactics “to demoralize pro-government forces. Those efforts backfired and made the South African appear to many to be the lesser of two evils.”¹³⁹

Tactical choices made by the RSA almost undermined the success of the information campaign. The special police organization Koevoet, made up of former SWAPO insurgents who had gone over to government control, gained a reputation for both brutality and effectiveness. Abuses by Koevoet units became propaganda victories for the opposition and undercut the military and counter mobilization advantages of the unit.¹⁴⁰ Unlike its conventional operations, RSA

¹³⁷ Annette Seegers , *Military in the Making of Modern South Africa*, 150. Seegers comments are in the context of Soweto uprising but are indicative of RSA attitudes in general.

¹³⁸ Hilton Hamman , *Days of the Generals: the Untold Story of South Africa's Apartheid-Era Military Generals* (Cape Town: Zebra, 2001), 61.

¹³⁹ Bell, “Cold War Campaign”, 10.

¹⁴⁰ Thomas G. Mitchell , *Native vs. Settler*: “The leading and most notorious unit was Koevoet ...reputed to carry out atrocities that were then attributed to PLAN. ...Members of Koevoet and certain other units were paid bounties...for each person killed, thereby encouraging the atrocities. One Koevoet commander said that the unit had a

COIN operations were successful because of their ability to link success in two of hybrid wars battles for an informational advantage. This is further evidence of the required linkage between military operations and popular support inherent in hybrid war. Success in military operations can erode gains in the information campaign.¹⁴¹ An awareness of this risk and the need to balance operations is a hallmark of a strategic view of hybrid war.

Employing other IOPS - Destabilization Operations

The South African strategy sought to make use of other instruments of national power to achieve their strategic objectives. According to Beaufre, “The political decision, always a necessity, can only be brought about by a proper combination of limited military action and appropriate psychological, economic, and diplomatic activity.”¹⁴² Total strategy sought to harness these instruments of national power (IOPs) to achieve a synergistic effect. The RSA’s offensive use of these IOPs outside the RSA was collectively referred to as the policy of Destabilization.. Successful destabilization was “defined by negatives” in that the goal was to keep the opponent and their allies off balance while avoiding both a long-term financial and military commitment.¹⁴³ The RSA attempted to do this through economic coercion, diplomacy, covert attacks, and sustained unconventional warfare (UW) against nations supportive of opposition movements.

policy of not taking prisoners and that his men were trained as killing machines. .” The South Africans claimed complaints against Koevoet was because of its effectiveness. This is further evidence of the growing disconnect between South African tactics and information operations. See Heitman , *South African War Machine*,110-113 and Hamman , *Days of the Generals*,64-65 for the South African view of Koevoet.

¹⁴¹ It appears that the RSA was more aware of this in Namibia than in Angola. See Norwal, *Death in the Desert*,104-105.

¹⁴² Andre Beaufre, *Strategy for Tomorrow*. (Crane, Russak, and Co., New York, 1974.),3.

¹⁴³ Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*,92. Manpower in sense this refers mainly to white conscripts.

South Africa with its extensive natural resources, developed infrastructure, and global trading relationships was the economic juggernaut of Southern Africa. The RSA sought to use that economic advantage as leverage both internationally and regionally. As one author explains the “Pretoria’s regional strategy, based on the fact that apartheid was anathema in Africa, was to keep all of its neighbors off balance and dependent on it economically.”¹⁴⁴ The RSA hoped to use this regional economic dominance to facilitate diplomatic concessions. When passive economic efforts proved unsuccessful the RSA used unconventional warfare, covert action, and conventional military strikes to target economic and political targets in neighboring nations.¹⁴⁵ This mix of economic carrots and military sticks led to a “diplomatic triumph of near-unimaginable proportions” when the government of Mozambique signed the Nkomati Accord with the RSA to end support for the ANC for a cessation of South African support of the MNR.¹⁴⁶ The South African supported MNR had caused such economic devastation that Mozambique was willing to publicly expel the ANC from the country.¹⁴⁷ Similar economic coercion was employed against Zambia and Botswana to limit support for the ANC. This diplomatic efforts coupled with military actions effectively interdicted the movement of ANC guerillas into the RSA. The Nkomati accords were both a military and information victory for the South Africans but their

144 Thomas G. Mitchell, *Native vs. Settler*.

145 Kevin A. O’Brien, “Special Forces for Counter Revolutionary Warfare: the South African Case.” *Small Wars and Insurgencies* (January 2001, 12):279-109. The TRC also lists a number of covert operations conducted throughout Southern Africa. Attacks on Oil facilities in Angola, and infrastructure attacks in Mozambique are two typical examples.

146Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 95. The accord greatly increased the RSA prestige at the expense of Black Nationalist leaders in the Region “black ruled Africa’s charismatic revolutionary had been brought low, low enough to sign away his protection on the ANC in return for a South African promise to rein in the MNR.”

147 Steven Metz, “The Mozambique National Resistance and South African Foreign Policy” *African Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 341. (Oct., 1986.: 491-507).

impacts was short-lived as other RSA actions undermined this diplomatic and information success.

More overt military operations against the ANC, and governments unwilling to submit to economic coercion led to international condemnation and reinforced the image of the RSA as the aggressor. RSA direct strikes in May 1983 against three separate regional capitals and support for an attempted mercenary coup in the Seychelles were seen as unjustified military aggression.¹⁴⁸ When covert support for MNR in violation of the Nkomati accord was exposed the RSA lost the momentum from its diplomatic successes. This perceived duplicity, coupled with the MNR's indiscriminate killing and collateral damage from other attacks reinforced the image of the RSA as warmongering racists rather than defensive anti-communists.¹⁴⁹ Regional nations were no longer confident that RSA would keep its political agreements and become increasingly unwilling to conduct negotiations. As a result, South African diplomatic power decreased in both importance and effectiveness. The inability to use and link diplomatic, military and economic success for lasting informational advantage had again proven decisive. This was a failure to understand hybrid war and adjust the strategy accordingly to win the decisive battle for international and domestic support.

The Decisive Battle-Domestic Support and Media

McCuen's conceptualization of hybrid war argues that decisive victory is only possible when the home front and the international community continue to support the actions necessary for success in military endeavors. The decisive role of information operations in conventional and

148 Legum, *Battlefronts of South Africa*, 333-334.

149 For an overview of operations in Mozambique see Metz, "The Mozambique National Resistance" for the impact of other covert operations see Hamman, *Days of the Generals*, 132-134.

unconventional operations has been previously discussed; this section will focus on how those efforts were or were not linked to RSA information operations for its domestic and international audiences. Support is gained by an integrated communications plan and well developed strategic communications to both domestic and international audiences. McCuen believes, “hybrid war must be fought using what has been the most decisive Strategic Center of Gravity of all – establishing and maintaining support of the war by the home front and international community, in other words, an effective National Strategic Communications Program.”¹⁵⁰ This explicit psychological emphasis was in keeping with Andre Beaufre observation that, “Wars are not won on the battlefield, but in the minds of men.”¹⁵¹ Importantly in the context of hybrid war, Beaufre argued that the strategy to bring about that victory was constrained by “two important domains...mass media and domestic public opinion.”¹⁵² In hybrid war failure to maintain and capitalize on these linkages determines overall success or failure of the campaign.

The RSA in many cases is a worst-case scenario for the conduct of information operations to influence a population. As a minority government ruling through force, the RSA at best, could hope for passivity or neutrality from the majority of the black population. Total Strategy with its psychological focus did not avoid this challenge and allocated resources to try to convince even the most hardened opponent that cooperation was in their best interests. RSA information operations tried to create the perception of legitimacy at home and abroad for its

150 McCuen, “Art of Hybrid War”:82.

149 Andre Beaufre, Quoted in “The Role of Media under Apartheid” *African National Congress Submission on Media to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, September 1997.*

152 Andre Beaufre, *Strategy for Tomorrow* (New York :Crane, Russak, and Co.)1974,3-4.

military actions and public policies using the narrative of anticommunism and total onslaught.¹⁵³

Just as the RSA was forced to fight on diverse battlefield against diverse opponents, it had to develop a diverse message that appealed to specific audiences. The challenge for the RSA was how to use one narrative to appeal to a diverse and often ideologically opposed audience. Author Allen Cowell summarized the challenge as follows:

“The white folks back home were not supposed to know what mischief and mayhem their leaders had gotten their conscript sons into. The black folks were not supposed to suppose to contemplate the Afrikaners in direct battle with the continents’ newest champion of black power. And the world was not supposed to believe the fiction that Pretoria was involved at all.”¹⁵⁴

This was an attempt to craft a message to solicit support that McCuen believes are the decisive centers of gravity of hybrid war. The interrelationship between perceived legitimacy and casualties is a reoccurring theme that must be addressed to impact this COG.¹⁵⁵

RSA international media efforts were conducted as part of the larger cold war rivalry between the communist world and the West. There was wide spread opposition to apartheid and cross-border operations in the world media. International media coverage and support from international organizations gave the RSA’s opponents an opportunity to gain support and solicit funding. The world press labeled the RSA “an out and out aggressor in the Hitlerian mould” for its ‘external’ operations despite South Africa efforts to portray them as necessary components of its anti-communism struggle.¹⁵⁶ The RSA racial policies and Apartheid laws received similar

153 Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 50. “question of competing legitimacies: if the guerilla armies could justify their recourse to violence by reference to the ‘just cause’ of democracy and freedom, then their enemies [the RSA] justified their resistance by reference to ‘holding the line’ against communism in the broader context of the cold war.”

154 Ibid., 50.

155 McCuen, “Hybrid Wars”, 111. “Winning and maintaining support for the war on the home front(s) and in the international community. Doing so means maintaining legitimacy and avoiding losses through incompetence.”

156 Steenkamp, *Borderstike*, 19.

coverage and condemnation.¹⁵⁷ This created an almost insurmountable obstacle for the RSA to gain support from African and Western democracies. As long as the RSA could depict the conflict in terms of communism and democracy rather than in terms of race, they could find a small but receptive audience aboard and at home.¹⁵⁸ When they linked military and information operations as in Namibia they achieved success. When the RSA was unable to link its military and information operations or surrendered information initiative to its opponents the RSA was not successful. The RSA's opponents capitalized on these mistakes to portray the conflict as anti-colonialism and anti-racist to increase their moral authority internationally and with the black domestic population.¹⁵⁹

Domestic media was essential to Beuafre's concept of Total Strategy. In this regard, the RSA had an advantage in that much of the South African media was state owned allowing them to control much of the information reaching its core audiences. Gil Merom in his study *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*, examines how key domestic constituency (even a minority) once they perceive a protracted conflict as immoral or unwinnable can determine the success or failure of the entire military campaign.¹⁶⁰ The State monopoly of key media aided the RSA operations, so much so that the ANC believed "the South African Broadcasting Corporation was the most

157 Hilton Hamman, *Days of the Generals*, 128.

158 Ignoring the inherent difficulty of convicting a liberal Western audience on the merits of Apartheid, the inability of some of the RSA's key leaders to execute their information campaign aided the ANC. This was especially true concerning South African Foreign Secretary Pik Botha. As Loew, observes, "Western politicians and journalists... were simply baffled by Botha-Speak, which translated into a major public relations liability. It was a...problem that the ANC learned to skillfully exploit." *Legacy of Apartheid*, 90

159 The TRC highlights the fine line the RSA was attempting to walk with its information campaigns. "while some acts of regional destabilization may have been a defence against Communism, the purpose of the war was also to preserve white minority rule in South Africa and was, therefore, a race war." TRC Vol. 2, 43.

¹⁶⁰ Gil Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-17 and 230-231.

important weapon in the apartheid state's battle for the hearts and minds of the people.”¹⁶¹ This virtual monopoly though did not drastically change moral perceptions. Thus media was both a limiting factor and a possible source of support under total strategy. “Crucial because it molds public opinion to the point where war is acceptable to the public and it also demoralizes the public and makes compromise possible. Compromises are the only type of result possible in limited war.”¹⁶² Compromise in the case of South Africa government would have meant giving the black majority a greater say in political life but at a pace and time chosen by the white government to maintain their positions of power.¹⁶³ Instead, South African leaders instituted a series of reforms not linked to operational objectives of undercutting the base of black opposition. Instead of creating reforms to address the source of domestic black opposition, the reforms of 1983 only gave the “malcontents something to be malcontent about.”¹⁶⁴ Government appeals for support from its domestic black population focused more on stability and economic issues while also exploiting ethnic and tribal divisions within the population. In an attempt to replicate its COIN success aboard, the RSA planned, conducted, and publicized civic action projects and medical assistance within the black townships. Military forces, included forces freed from successful external operations were committed to reestablishing order domestically. To coordinate these efforts the RSA used the regional coordination centers developed under Total

¹⁶¹ African National Congress Submission on Media to the TRC, “The Role of Media under Apartheid”(September 1997), <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/misc/mediasub.html>

¹⁶² Beaufre, *Strategy for Tomorrow*, 4.

¹⁶³ Cowell, *Killing the Wizards* , 91. South African leaders “acknowledged as Beaufre had taught ,that there had to change of some kind. Yet change needed managements, it needed an environment in which no external forces could upset the process initiated and implemented by the Afrikaner minority.”

¹⁶⁴ Cowell,, *Killing the Wizards*, 143.

strategy to coordinate whole of government actions.¹⁶⁵ This had the opposite effect intended and showed that the domestic situation in the RSA was spiraling out of control.

The RSA's continuing state of emergency exacerbated this perception of illegitimacy and race war. South Africa sought to substitute economic and military leverage to mitigate their opponents information successes. Furthermore, the RSA strategy was built upon using economic benefits to bolster legitimacy amongst its black and white populations. This could not be sustained because of the dual impact of spreading popular unrest and economic divesture. By 1986, the world reaction and financial isolation had transformed South Africa "from a high flying player in the Western economy" into "a "third World Debtor."¹⁶⁶ Some estimates indicate that sanctions hindered economic growth over five-year period by as much as one third of the total RSA gross domestic product.¹⁶⁷ The RSA's control of strategic minerals was no longer sufficient leverage to overcome Western nation's moral opposition to Apartheid. An economic crisis ensued causing increased hardship for whites who were being asked to abandon production jobs for increased military service. Apartheid policies which prevented the use of blacks to replace these white conscripts and recalled reservists only made things worse. South African efforts in the townships to buy loyalty through socioeconomic benefits faltered as revenues decreased.¹⁶⁸ Economic hardship also increased revolutionary sentiment among the black citizens. As the State

¹⁶⁵ Hamman, *Days of the Generals*, 58. Through these coordination centers, the highest levels of military were able to intervene in day-to-day tasks performed by other government entities, such as garbage removal, and sanitation in order to ensure they were supporting the overall domestic security efforts.

¹⁶⁶ Cowell, *Killing the Wizards*, 178


¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 178-179.

of emergency continued with no end in sight, extrajudicial actions become sanctioned and the last vestiges of the RSA's legitimacy disappeared. Violence against blacks supportive of the regime intensified. No longer could the RSA anti-communist narrative or media censorship control the perceptions of white South Africans and the international community. Unable to buy obedience or legitimacy through its much-reduced economic instruments, the RSA turned more towards the use of the military. The RSA's inability to implement change had created the very revolutionary atmosphere it was designed to prevent. Without public support and will to persevere, military actions in support for the overall objectives of the conflict become futile efforts. In the case of the RSA the political goals of measured reform to keep white rule become untenable despite military dominance. Military power could not compensate enough to overcome perceptions of state powerlessness and decline. The ANC once military defeated and isolated from its own population capitalized on the situation to force concessions from the new RSA political leadership that enabled their eventual assumption of power and the end of Apartheid. Success in hybrid wars requires an acknowledgment of this linkage between military actions, domestic and international opinion and the development of an appropriate strategy to ensure these linkages are mutually supportive of each other. The RSA failed to understand these complex linkages.

Conclusion

In the end, what does the study of the South Africa campaign teach the modern American military planner confronted by hybrid war? The RSA case study is a strong argument for moving beyond hybrid warfare and its tactical focus and beginning to understand the challenges of fighting and winning hybrid wars. One conclusion that can be stated with some confidence is that hybrid wars defy simple solutions. The complex interactions between tactics, strategy and

information operations simultaneously at different levels of war make planning and fighting hybrid wars an exercise in managing complexity.¹⁶⁹ One means to begin to understand such complex or “wicked problems” is to propose a solution for them.¹⁷⁰ McCuen’s paradigm does just that for hybrid war. McCuen’s definition provides a good starting point for further development of a working concept of hybrid war. Hybrid war requires both an appreciation for and the application of creative thinking and operational art at their finest. Achieving victory, as it is currently understood, may not be possible in hybrid war. Rather success in any hybrid wars of the future will require simultaneous successful and in depth achievement in all three of the domains and levels of war. Hybrid wars are innately strategic struggles for legitimacy and control influenced but not necessarily determined exclusively by battlefield actions. The following metaphor seeks to capture both the difficulty of planning and conducting hybrid war as envisioned by McCuen.



¹⁶⁹ Beaufre stresses complexity throughout his writings, “Thus, there is an Inherent recognition in the doctrine of Total Strategy of the complexity of modern battlefields.” *Strategy for Tomorrow*, IX.

¹⁷⁰ Horst W. J Rittel, and Melvin W. Webber “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” *Policy Sciences* (Vol..4 ,1973): 161. “The information need to understand the problem depends upon one’s idea for solving it.”

Planners for hybrid war could be compared to a circus juggler performing his act on a balance board. In order to be successful, both the Planner and the juggler have to simultaneously keep various elements in constant motion while exercising management and control. The more varied the elements, the more difficult the task. The juggler has chosen three different elements: a chainsaw, a dagger and a raw egg. He must successfully and simultaneously manipulate and influence these varied elements while maintaining his balance on the board. If the juggler is successful, he will continue to be considered a viable member of the circus troupe and receive accolades from the audience. If not the performance will end in failure and another performer(his opponent) will take the stage. The planner, just as the juggler, has to also maintain balance while keeping three different elements going simultaneously. The planner, in hybrid war will deal with three different battles. Conventional Warfare represented by the chainsaw; loud, heavy and difficult to conceal but capable of great damage whether the damage inflicted is intentional or unintentional. Irregular Warfare represented by the dagger; smaller, less noticed, and more easily concealed, employed in many different ways, capable of being employed as a means of terror/intimidation or distraction but also capable of great damage. Information Operations represented by a raw egg; small, fragile, obvious when broken, but when properly squeezed a source of strength and/or sustenance. While keeping three elements in the air, both the juggler and the planner must also deal with the constant shifting of the balance board. The juggler adjusts his position to maintain balance and simultaneously control the elements in the air. The planner, on the other hand, adjusts the strategy, his technique, and his areas of focus to meet the challenge of changing conditions in order to maintain control and movement of the elements in the air. For both the Juggler and the planner, all their actions are conducted in front of an audience that will consist of management, supporters, critics, the apathetic, the uninterested and the bored. Both the Juggler and the planner will be judged by the audience as to how well they have used all the elements at their disposal to conclude the performance. The totality of the performance, the effective balancing multiple objects, decides the matter. So it is with hybrid war, where the

totality of opinions and perceptions caused by the employment of the different components decide the issue. The awareness of the whole is best a question of strategy not of tactics. Tactical based concepts of hybrid war focus on what the juggler has in his hand but ignore both how they interact, their different unique characteristics, and are how they used by the juggler.

This paper has shown in the case of South Africa despite winning the conventional and irregular military campaign against both domestic and external insurgencies, the RSA did not obtain its strategic goals. The RSA is a case of winning battles but losing the war because of the inability to convert physical success into cognitive and moral success. The intellectual origins of Total Strategy with its emphasis on how military operations were used to achieve a psychological effect should have better prepared the RSA to evaluate the success or failure of its campaign. The inability of the RSA to link its operations to its strategic goals, to successfully win on all three battlefields of hybrid war at once, led to the ultimate failure of the campaign.

South African conventional operations such as Cassinga and Cuito Canavalle were militarily successful but did not change perceptions of key domestic and international audiences. Their opponent's ability to protract the conflict and inflict casualties undermined the will of white citizens while decreasing the legitimacy of the government with black populations. RSA COIN operations were more successful in achieving a linkage between military operations to influence domestic and international perceptions. This linkage allowed the RSA to obtain a successful compromise that granted Namibia independence without establishing a sanctuary for opposition groups. This compromise came too late to alter growing opposition at home and reestablish balance to the overall RSA campaign. RSA efforts to regain momentum through the use of diplomatic and economic leverage to destabilize and coerce neighboring states were unsuccessful because of continued domestic turmoil and the effects of international economic isolation. Military operations could not restore that balance to sufficiently alter perceptions in favor of the RSA. Domestic perceptions were shaped by concern over casualties and economic costs while

international perceptions hinged on Apartheids' illegitimacy and RSA's use of military force. The reforms implemented in 1983 unhinged and unbalanced the RSA's strategy to such a point that it could not recover. As one author explained "...the South African's failed for one primary reason: the inability to offer a political objective which the population would support."¹⁷¹ In a hybrid war, success is only possible by balancing the simultaneous needs and actions of the conventional, unconventional, domestic and international information battlefields. The RSA because it could not find such a balance, lost its hybrid war.

Recommendations

This paper and its initial recommendations are an attempt to begin asking the questions necessary to fight and win hybrid wars. Winning hybrid wars will require the United States to implement operational art style of thinking at all levels of conflict. It will require as McCuen argues a paradigmatic shift in conducting operations so that each action is mutually supportive and does not undermine the critical need to win support for the campaign from domestic and international audiences. Victory in hybrid war is only possible by achieving success simultaneously on the conventional, unconventional, and domestic and international information battlefields. It is the proper arrangement of these actions in time and space for an explicit and coherent purpose that appears to be decisive. Further efforts are needed on how to conceptualize a plan to balance those conflicting goals and how to develop suitably measures of performance and effectiveness for those actions. History has been a source of theory and the US has not looked deep or wide enough at other hybrid wars. The RSA case study while beneficial is not the only lesser-examined case of hybrid war. Cases studies of hybrid war used in future discussion need to be

171 Obrien, "Special Forces for Counter Revolutionary War": 82.

expanded to include as many diverse experiences as possible. Additional research on the South African experience should focus on the SWAPO and ANC perspectives, information strategies and their decision points for organizational and structural change.

The use of the term “hybrid” in current debate needs to be placed in its proper context before it is incorporated into doctrine. Once included in doctrine the authors need to make a clear distinction between hybrid war and hybrid warfare. The continuing failure to separate hybrid war and hybrid warfare gives the advantage to the opponent and reinforces already identified shortfalls in American military approaches to war. McCuen’s concept should be adopted as an initial definition of hybrid war so the concept can become part of military professional education. This will allow further refinement of the concept and move the debate beyond questions of procurement for future conflicts. As T.X. Hammes points out in future conflicts “one is not faced with an either-or proposition. Rather, we must do both. Prudence requires we be ready to fight across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. So, a better question is how to organize, educate, train and equip a force that is capable of doing so.”¹⁷² By adapting a definition of hybrid war, the US military can begin to address these broader concerns and undertake the paradigmatic shift required to implement them. The doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications of hybrid war for the US Army will be profound and will require extensive and continuous refinement.

Planning for hybrid war requires a style of thinking that acknowledges an awareness of how an action to achieve success in one dimension of the conflict can undermine

172 T.X. Hammes, "The Art of Petraeus", *National Interest*, November December 2008: 57.

actions in another.¹⁷³ Appendix Three is a first attempt using current definitions of Operational Art to conceptualize this problem. Current experiments with complex adaptive systems theory, operational design and campaign methodology can inform the debate of hybrid war. The developer of a hybrid war "campaign plan" must begin with the realization that hybrid wars are waged at all levels of war using varying tactics to bring about a physical and psychological change simultaneously. The strategic goals of the conflict should be sufficiently developed as to provide a unifying information narrative easily communicable to diverse audiences. The narrative should address key audiences and explain why military operations are necessary, what the goals and expected cost of the conflict are, and what should be expected at the end of the fighting. How proposed actions in support of that strategy help or hinder the obtainment of those goals needs to be constantly assessed and incorporated into future planning decision. They should not preclude future operations but will help determine how changes in perceptions will influence long-term goals.

As domestic and international opinion is the decisive battle in hybrid war, planners upon the initiation of campaign should identify key populations that must stay supportive of operations. The techniques of target audience analysis in psychological operations may be a starting point for identifying those key constituencies based on the objective of the overall campaign. This is a difficult task because it presupposes linear relationships that may not be determinable or may not exist. Domestic support is vital to long-term success in hybrid war but the creating and delivering a message to a domestic audience by the United States military would be a controversial decision.

167 Dietrich Dorner, discusses this as the difference between Methodism, and systemic thinking. "We must learn that in complex systems we cannot do only one thing. Whether we want it or not, any step we take will affect many other things." Dietrich Dorner, *Logic of Failure: Why things go wrong and what We can do to make them right* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996.)

This may be a better role for a senior political decision maker. The ongoing debates about the role of public affairs and strategic communication should help inform this decision. Psychological operations doctrine may serve as departure point for the selection of audiences and techniques to employ to maintain support. Hybrid war requires a focus on the international arena as well. Examples include the United Nations, NATO members and their citizens, key regional allies, and trading partners. A point of further research may be whether current Strategic Communications doctrine can support or be sufficiently modified to enable increased effectiveness of message delivery and development. Increased cultural awareness and understanding of the opponent may be necessary to avoid issues of mirroring. The blurring of levels of war hybrid war identifies the need for expanded understanding of information and strategic communications at all levels of military planning.

Information operations like military operations will reach a culminating point. The concept of culminating point should address popular support, national will and media message. The narrative and message of message needs to change and adopt to avoid information fatigue.¹⁷⁴ Information operations must be based on a central theme supportive of the strategic narrative but that narrative must be adapted to the changing conditions of the campaign to still has resonance with desired audience. Early identification of this culminating point may aid in the creation of a dynamic narrative that maintains initiative in the cognitive battle, preempts enemy information operations, and explicitly makes the planner address the impact of operations on the message.

174 The South African experience shows how difficult developing and maintaining domestic support for a narrative is. In protracted struggles, the audience can quickly grow tired. Kenneth W. Gundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 17. "Like a coin whose value-imprint becomes obscured by excessive handling, the term 'total onslaught' has lost currency because people feel it has been overexposed and overused." The implication is that information operations like tactical operations have a culminating point. Early identification of this culminating point may aid in the creation of a dynamic narrative that maintains initiative in the cognitive battle.

Development of metrics to gauge when one is approaching this culminating point will need to be initially identified and modified based on the conduct of the campaign.

A whole of government approach is essential but it is not sufficient for success in achieving balance in Hybrid war. The South African experience shows that structural changes instituted to facilitate unity of the effort were essential but were not sufficient to guarantee success. The RSA efforts early on recognized the Hybrid Wars required political solutions and political involvement.¹⁷⁵ The RSA experience shows how what begins as whole of governance approach can devolve into military domination during execution. This reaffirms the need for involvement of political leadership throughout planning and execution of the campaign. Further efforts at interagency development should proceed but remain cautions of military dominance in their thinking and approach to war. The American system of check and balances and its impact of strategy decision making may not be sufficient to prevent similar possible abuses. Whole of government planning not military dominance of government planning is the goal. In the South African case, the perception of military dominance and primacy decreased the legitimacy of both their message and their actions. American planners should instead seek to harness the best of worlds- military planning skill and the appeal of American democratic institutions.

Selection of measure of performance and effectiveness may be a means to attempt to obtain balance. Despite a strategy based on psychological victories, the RSA repeatedly used attritional metrics as a measure of success. McCuen emphasizes that a similar attritional mindset led to failure in Vietnam. Such an approach may be acceptable for the more physically oriented

¹⁷⁵ Chief of the SADF Magnus Malan, explained the shifting the burden from war fighters to political leaders.” Military we can win the war. We can win it tomorrow. But this type of battle you can never win in the military field. You win it in the political field.” Grundy, *Militarization of South African Politics*, 27.

conventional battles but may undermine support at home and the international community.

Planners must develop both qualitative and quantitative measure of effectiveness and performance that seek to better capture the linkage between physical and psychological actions. Previously these may have been present in but they need to be made more explicit in order to allow planners to modify their strategy appropriately.

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GLOSSARY

COIN	Counterinsurgency
ANC	African National Congress. Political opposition movement to Apartheid government.
BOSS	Bureau of State Security
DoD	Department of Defense
IOPs	Instruments of National Power
IO	Information operations
FAPLA	Portuguese Acronyms Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) the armed wing of the Angolan MPLA movement. Upon victory of the MPLA became the country's official armed forces.
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FNLA	Portuguese Acronym for Frente Nacioanal de Libertacao de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) Opposition group to MPLA in Angola, became a political movement in 1992.
Koeveot	Afrikaans for Crowbar. Elite police counter terrorism unit formed by South Africa in 1979 to conduct paramilitary operations against SWAPO infiltrators. Included a number of former SWAPO insurgents who had come over to the government. Developed a reputation for brutality as well as effectiveness
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho (The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Party of Labour). Marxist Communist political party that has ruled Angola since 1975 used sinuously with its .
MK	Abbreviation for Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the African National Congress
NDS	National Defense Strategy
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia. Military wing of SWAPO
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SADF	South African Defence Force, renamed SANDF post 1989.
SWA	South West Africa , now Namibia
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
SWATF	South West African Territorial Force
UNITA	Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). South African supported insurgent movement in Angola seeking the overthrow of the Marxist MPLA. Conducted combined operations with South African in Angola. Led by Jonas Savambi until his death in 2002.
UW	Unconventional Warfare
ANC	African National Congress
Umkhonto we Sizwe	Spear of the Nation the military wing of the African National Congress. Abbreviated as MK.
RENAMO	Portuguese Acronym Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, South African sponsored proxy forces in Mozambique.
SSC	State Security Council
Total Onslaught	Overall narrative of South African strategy based on belief that opposition movements were controlled, inspired and directed by monolithic communist forces bent on revolutionary change in South Africa.
WHAM	“winning hearts and minds” Short hand summary of McCuen and Beaufre emphasis on wining the support of the population adopted by the SADF. Stresses psychological manipulation, political flexibility, and finesse rather than uncompromising coercion of the indigenous black population.”

Definitions

Center of Gravity: The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act." (Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)(Washington, DC:2008))

Comprehensive approach :the approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal (FM 3-07).

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

Counterterrorism: Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

Full spectrum operations: Full-spectrum operations entail the application of combat power through simultaneous and continuous combinations of four elements: offense, defense, stability, and civil support. (FM 3.0)

Hybrid war (working):A symmetric and asymmetric war in which intervening forces conduct traditional military operations against enemy military forces and targets while they must simultaneously and more decisively attempt to achieve control of the combat zone's indigenous populations by securing and stabilizing. All operations must be conducted in such a manner as to maintain international and domestic support for continued lethal and non-lethal operations in pursuit of strategic goals. (Modification of Definition proposed by J. McCuen)

Hybrid warfare (working): The employment of an intentional and coordinated blend of conventional and unconventional tactics augmented by technology and information operations by a state or non-state actor to force a opponent to fight at a disadvantage. Distinct from hybrid war in that it almost exclusively focused on the military dimension of the conflict; the way an opponent wages a broader hybrid war strategy.

Information operations: (joint) The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. (JP 1-02)

Irregular forces: Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02)

Irregular challenges : Challenges posed by those employing unconventional methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. (NDS)

Irregular warfare: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

Legitimacy: A multifaceted principle that impacts every aspect of stability operations from every conceivable perspective. Legitimacy derives from the legal framework that governs the state and the source of that authority. It reflects not only the supremacy of the law, but also the foundation upon which the law was developed: the collective will of the people through the consent of the governed

Traditional Warfare: A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary's armed forces, destroy an adversary's war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary's government or policies. (DoDD 3000.07 SUBJECT: Irregular Warfare (IW), December 1, 2008.)

Moral: expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior ,a moral poem, c: conforming to a standard of right behavior d: sanctioned by or operative on one's conscience or ethical judgment.

Narrative: The central mechanism, expressed in story form, through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed. (FM 3-24)

Unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW. (JP 1-02)

Whole of Government : an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. (FM 3-07)

APPENDIX ONE: Various Depictions of Hybrid War

HYBRID WAR AS TACTIC

Quad Chart of Threats (Menu)

Irregular	Catastrophic
Traditional	Disruptive

SVG Hybrid War as a Blending of Threats



Figure 1 USMC Conceptualization. From Power Point Brief "Future Conflict Conference "Hybrid Threats in Complex Environments" 22-24 April 2008 Gray Research Center Quantico, Virginia.

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS






Figure 2 Fm 3.0


HYBRID WAR AS CONTINUUM

RW=Regular Warfare, IW=Irregular Warfare
CW= Compound War, HW=Hybrid Warfare



HYBRID WAR AS STRATEGY





This attempts to capture in two dimensions the diverse battlefields of hybrid war, and the interactions of each. It is incomplete and insufficient to capture the complexity of the interactions

Squares represent both Actors and Key constituents. Generally, they would not change in size. Circles represent actions by category/battlefield and the bounds of those actions. They expand and contract in response to the Actors perceptions and actions they also overlap with other categories. All actions and actors are bound and influenced by the collective information environment. The ideal would be to find balance in these efforts or to fill the void created by enemy counteractions in the information sphere.

APPENDIX TWO: Timeline Of The South African Campaign

1965	1965 the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) established. Military operations commence shortly after from base camps in Zambia
1966-7	PLAN penetrates Ovambo tribal areas of North Namibia and establishes a safe haven. SAP destroyed the camp in a surprise attack. SWAPO continues a series of incursions. This would be the only major SWAPO sanctuary established within Namibia. 1967 - The Terrorism Act is passed in South Africa; MK guerrillas conduct their first military actions in northwestern Rhodesia in campaigns known as Wankie and Sepolilo. South African Police deploy to Rhodesia to assist in COIN fight and monitor ANC/MK. Develops COIN doctrine.
1968	SWAPO infiltrates from Zambia, but defeated. Launches attacks in Caprivi strip, defeated by specialized CT police units. SWAPO limited activity until 1971. South Africa creates the Bureau of State Security (BOSS)
1970-1974	The International Court of Justice revokes South Africa's mandate of Namibia, international pressure increases on RSA(1971). First use of mines by SWAPO (1970-1). RSA increases length of conscription of white citizens(1972). RSA develops a Special Forces division (1974)
1975	Portugal grants Angola and Mozambique independence. SADF assumes responsibility for Namibia border from SAP. Cuban's Launch Operation Carlotta; First Cuban advisors and equipment arrive in Angola . October 1975, RSA launches Operation Savannah begins as a Covert operation at first to support pro-western factions in Angola civil war but uncovered by interactional press. SADF within striking range of Angolan capital but under international pressure RSA withdraws. MPLA fills vacuum consolidates power. Organization of African Unity recognizes MPLA government. Local indigenous forces funded, recruited and fielded for COIN in Namibia, forces eventually becomes Koveot Special police and elements of the SWATF.
1976	Withdrawal of the South African forces from Angola, MPLA assumes control of Angola. SWAPO establishes base camps. SWAPO increases attacks and infiltrations throughout Namibia from bases in Angola and Zambia. First COIN efforts start in Namibia. 16 June: Large scale rioting in Soweto Township in South Africa. Rioting last for three weeks followed by harsh repression by government forces. Soweto uprising seen as sign of "undeclared civil war" ;large number of youths flee RSA to join guerillas. South Africa initiates Total Strategy.
1977	Government repression of "Black consciousness " leaders continues, number die in custody including Stephen Biko. South African government passes Defense Amendment Act of 1977, which authorizes use of SADF personnel outside the territorial bounds of the republic. Repressive measure contains domestic unrest within South Africa but continues to drive away supporters of government. French government in response joins international arms embargo of RSA. Embargo begins to affect South African Air Force who relies on French for parts and equipment. SWAPO infiltrates into Namibia in larger number, RSA conducts pursuit operations. RSA conducts Exercise Blitz One to strengthen conventional mechanized warfare capabilities. Exercise is based on defeating an enemy mechanized division that had crossed into South Africa from Namibia. RSA begins developing South West African Territorial Force recruited from native Namibians. 32 Battalion formed from defeated Angola opposition, begins unconventional operations in Angola. RSA initiates Operation Silwer where the RSA provides covert support to UNITA until 1983. Angolans increase sizes of their Army and receive additional Cuban, Soviet and East German support. 18,000 Cuban troops in Angola.
1978	Operation Reindeer air and paratroop attack on SWAPO's training and logistic support base at Cassinga, simultaneous ground assault on other camps. RSA claims 1000 members of SWAPO killed, dead portrayed as refugees and victims of Apartheid aggression in international press. RSA ground column raids into Zambia to attack SWAPO mortar crews and UNITA ops increase in South Angola. RSA agrees in theory to Accept U.N. Resolution 435, which establishes conditions for Namibian independence. Negotiations break down over continued support of SWAPO by Communist bloc.
1979	Operations Safraan and Rekstok: conventional and unconventional strikes into Zambia against ANC base camps. Government of Zambia responds by banning SWAPO from operating in country. SADF interprets as a successful coercion by creating economic and military disruption of

	state sponsors of opposition. RSA establishes military School in Namibia. 32 Battalion begins covert UW campaign in Angola. Regional states opposed to RSA create South AFRICAN Development Coordination Conference in an attempt to lessen their economic dependence on RSA. In growing sign of distrust and disappointment with the West, RSA accuses US military attaches of espionage and expels them from the country.
1980	Rhodesian war ends. Operations Sceptic and Klipkop begin as cross border attacks against SWAPO escalate into Operation Smoke Shell lead to large-scale clashes between RSA and the Angolan Army and mechanized elements of SWAPO. SWAPO fights as both guerillas, conventional and terrorist force. SWATF established and reaches initial operating capability
1981	Operations Carnation ,Protea, Daisy. Maintain pressure on SWAPO. UW support of UNITA continues. SWAPO still receiving significant Soviet aid. RSA captures Soviet Advisor in Op Protea, begins sustained IO campaign. SWAPO logistics systems become reliant on Angola conventional forces. RSA conducts Operations Beanbag and KAT , special forces raids on ANC assets in Mozambique. Similarly Operation Kerslig [November 1981] – RSA special forces attack Angolan oil infrastructure.
1982	Reports on SWAPO movement begin to increase. Large-scale infiltration by elite specialized units of SWAPO into previously quiet urban centers in Namibia. COIN efforts continue to gain momentum in Namibia. SWAPO pressured to conduct large attack to regain prestige. UNITA increases pressure on Angolan government by taking key rail junction at Cazomba.. Soviet supply SWAPO and Angolans with top of the line equipment to include latest tanks and surface to arm missiles. RSA commandos conduct covert raid on ANC bases in Lesotho and Botswana. Operation Altar [1982 - 1984] RSA arms equipments and provides guidance to REMAMO/MNR proxy forces in Mozambique. RENAMO continue widespread attacks on infrastructure and are able to withstand Mozambique government assault.
1983	South Africa loses the initiative. Increased international pressure on RSA. RSA state president granted additional executive powers to authorize counter terrorism throughout Southern Africa without need for legislative or cabinet permission. Operation Super, Meebos, Phoenix launched. RSA operates in Brigade sized ground units with UNITA support. Air strikes up to 300kms inside Angola. SADF and SWATF defeat specialized SWAPO unit infiltration inflicting heavy casualties on most elite elements of SWAPO. In response Cuban troops and advanced weaponry (T-62 tanks, and Manpads) sent to Angola in preparation for offensive against UNITA. RSA launches Operation Askari (Dec 1983) to preempt offensive and maintain pressure on SWAPO. RSA conducts airstrikes and special forces raids vicinity of Mozambique capital of Maputo.
1984	RSA initiates constitutional reforms that includes Indians and colored /mixed race representation in government but still excludes black majority. Large-scale riots , work strikes and protests follow. Level of violence and extent of opposition will increase throughout black townships throughout the year and into the next. 1984 Lusaka accord signed, decreases MPLA support for SWAPO. The Nkomati Accord ,nonaggression treaty between RSA and Mozambique, signed on 16 March 1984. Joint Monitor Commission established to monitor the withdrawal of the South African troops from Angola. Angola pledges no SWAPO terrorists or Cuban forces would reoccupy territory. Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) consisting of RSA and Angolan units created to monitor cease fire provisions of Lusaka Accord.. Change in South Africa Strategy
1985	Last of SADF withdraw from Namibia. 16 May _JMC disbands, SWAPO increases infiltration. Operation Boswilger targets SWAPO infiltrators not stopped by U.N.. On 17 June 1985, the Transitional Government for National Unity was formed in Windhoek under RSA auspices. Not accepted by international community. Large Scale Riots in Sharpeville. 30thousand South African troops diverted to domestic operations. Operation Argon [May 1985] – RSA SF raid on oil storage tanks in Cabinda - Angola, which led to the capture RSA officer. Press coverage of raid is extensive , leads to increased difficulties for RSA IO. RSA conducts large conventional training exercise(Operation Vuiswys) in Northern Namibia as show of force-first use of RSA heavy armor. Angolan forces establish Cuito Canavalle as staging base for offensive against UNITA. RSA provides support to UNITA and defeats Angolan probes toward Mavinga. RSA conducts Operations Opeet and Concert, effective civil affairs and COIN missions in Kavango province of Namibia, Coin success forces SWAPO to shift infiltration routes.
1986	In Namibia, SWATF reaches operational status whereby it provides over 70% of forces in

	Namibia, 2000 reports on SWAPO's movement provided by populace. 1 SWAPO attacks reach lowest levels of conflict. US congress passes sanctions on RSA in October 1986. Violence continues throughout townships against government black supporters of the regime. Combination general strike and terrorist attacks makes large portions of South African countryside ungovernable. SADF increases troop commitment to police support, large number of arrests and killings in increased cycle of violence. RSA conducts hot pursuit operations into Angola. SWATF conducts preemptive attacks against SWAPO base camps and lodgments areas near border. Angolan forces continue to respond in support of SWAPO base camps, creating series of meriting engagements between RSA and combined SWAPO and Angolan forces.
1987	Angola launches large-scale attacks on UNITA bases in SE Angola. Angolan attack planned coordinated and supported by Russian and Cuban advisors. January Soviet conducts sustained airlift of supplies, commit over 1.5 billion of assets including heavy armor and advanced MANPADs. RSA intervenes to protect UNITA, and buffer zone along border. Launches Operations Modular and Hooper, which includes large-scale conventional forces supported by UNITA and UW assets. First deployment of RSA heavy armor. 2 OCT 1987 Battle of Cuito Canavalle begins
1988	Operations Packer and Displace. On March 23 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack on the town. UNITA with RSA support defeats two brigades of Angolans trying to cross Lomba river during heavy fighting from Aug to Sept. RSA increases commitment of forces and directly intervenes and inflicts heavy casualties on Angolans who begin to withdraw towards Cuito Canavalle. RSA lays siege to Cuito Canavalle. As siege continues, RSA conducts relief in place of forces, South African assault against entrenched forces East of Cuito Canavalle is repelled by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces. Negotiations for political settlement resume and enter new phase within agreement to Brazzaville Accord. RSA begins gradual withdrawal of forces. RSA president authorizes attacks against Council for Churches in Johannesburg. Elements associated with the government conduct assassinations, bombings, and other intimidation attacks on antiapartheid activists throughout the RSA.
1989	F.W. De Klerk assumes position as PM of RSA replacing P.W. Botha, author of Total Strategy. Political agreement establishes 1 April 1989 as implementation day for U.N. resolution. Both Cuba and RSA would withdrawal from area under U.N. supervision. SWAPO launches large-scale infiltration just prior to election to intimidate voters. SWAPO soundly defeated by recalled SWATF forces supported by SADF assets in Nine Day War.
1990	Namibia gains independence. SWAPO becomes government of Namibia after SWAPO receives majority of votes but not 2/3 necessary to rewrite constitution. Minority rights codified in Namibian constitution. President De Klerk repeals ban on ANC and frees ANC leader Nelson Mandela on 2 February
1994	Mandela Installed as President/1 st election based on One-man one vote ends white minority rule in RSA.

Sources:

Allen Cowell, Killing the Wizards, Colonel C.J Nöthling, "Military Chronicle Of South West Africa", South Africa's Forgotten War - Bases + Battlefield, <http://bbs.keyhole.com/ubb/showflat.php?Number=425893>, (Accessed 30 DEC 2008), South Africa Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Vol2, Chapter 2: The State outside South Africa between 1960 and 1990, and John W. Turner, *Continent Ablaze*, 250-251.

APPENDIX THREE: Toward an Operational Art Of Hybrid War

This appendix utilizes concepts and tenets of Operational Design in Joint Publication 5.0 to examine and clarify their possible application to developing a campaign for hybrid war. This appendix is by its nature generic and incomplete. The purpose then is to facilitate further study and debate about current understanding of operational design in context of hybrid war. The goal is not to provide a definitive checklist but to create points of departure for further inquiry. Each component of operational art will be discussed in relation to McCuen's concept of hybrid war. A series of Initial Questions for further study for each tenet is included as well.

Complicating issues-Linking Global, Theater and Subordinate Campaigns.

The unbounded nature of hybrid war gives it characteristics of both a global and theater campaign. The Subordinate campaigns (conventional and irregular) must reflect this inherent blurring of strategic, operational and tactical levels of war seen in conduct of hybrid war.

National Strategic End State: Defining Victory in hybrid war

Defining the national strategic end state for hybrid war is difficult. Hybrid war requires a different approach to what constitutes "victory," or success and the allocation of resources associated with previous conflicts. McCuen contends, "Victory or winning in hybrid war is the successful, permanent achievement of the assigned Strategic End states. If we fail to accomplish any one of them, we are likely to fail. Clearly, in hybrid war, as in any other war, strategic planning must be directed at correctly identifying the required Strategic End states and Centers of Gravity and then determining how we must best achieve them."¹⁷⁶

Systems Perspective and Complex Problems

JP 5.0 emphasizes using a Systems Perspective to develop and refine the understanding of the Operational Environment and Strategic guidance.¹⁷⁷ If approached broadly this allows for a discussion of the inability to "solve" the problems of complex adaptive systems. A systems perspective from the beginning facilitates discussion of victory in terms of acceptable end states rather than towards one finite end state. As a whole, this serves to make leadership confront the reality that traditional goals and termination may not be possible in hybrid war. Complexity theory can serve as a point of departure for gaining understanding and conveying the interrelationships required to develop a hybrid war campaign plan.

Strategic Guidance

Strategic guidance for winning a hybrid war needs to emphasize how military operations will be conducted in the unique context of the war. Strategic guidance should express clearly the primacy of maintaining support of key populations. Under McCuen's concept the campaign's Operational design should "focus from beginning to end of the campaign must be on the combat country, the home front and international community populations"¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ John McCuen, "Art of Hybrid War", 11.

¹⁷⁷ JP 5.0, III-12

¹⁷⁸ McCuen, "Art of Hybrid War", 13-14. "focus from beginning to end of the campaign must be on the combat country, the home front and international community populations",

Elements of Operational Design. All the elements of operational design have a role in the formulation of a hybrid war strategy.

Balance. Balance is the key component of hybrid war and Operational Art as applied to Hybrid War. Balance in hybrid war requires the employment of resources and force in such a manner as they contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness towards the addressing the decisive battle. Considerations include how to maintain the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to achieve both the military and influence objectives.

Questions:

1. What are the priority efforts to maintain balance?
2. What is the command structure and relationships that best balances the three battlefields?
3. How will identify when efforts are unbalanced?

Termination. Hybrid war since it is both psychical and conceptually based will have different terminating criteria than purely physical operations. Achieving a desired opinion is such an amorphous goal it is difficult to conduct traditional backwards planning. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, the commander must develop criteria to terminate the overall campaign but more importantly when to consider terminating conventional military operations because of their impact on public and international opinions. The JP 5.0 emphasis on “larger implicit bargaining process” as a means of termination seems to be in keeping with McCuen’s political solution.

Questions:

1. Will my proposed military termination criteria be perceived as legitimate?
2. How can the unit achieve its military objectives without creating undue or insurmountable information obstacles?
3. What are the opponent’s termination criteria?
4. What termination criteria best achieves military goals and sufficient public support?

End State. Hybrid wars are complex and adaptive, requiring a systems approach to both understanding and selection of an end state. End states for hybrid war exist in a zone of tolerance. That zone of tolerance in theory is the point where desired conventional, irregular and information objectives overlap and do not undermine each other. This may be an elusive goal. The strategic military objectives and definition of the military end state will blur in hybrid war. Military objectives in hybrid war need to be selected carefully to be mutually supporting of each other and not undermine the efforts to maintain international and public support.

Questions:

1. Will there be sufficient popular support to allow obtainment of the end state as currently envisioned? If not should the end state be modified?
2. If my actions still result insufficient support for obtainment of military objectives (conventional, Coin, IW) what future actions must be taken to increase support?
3. What objectives must be prioritized?
4. Does the proposed military end state help or hurt the perceived legitimacy of the campaign?

Culmination. In addition to tradition concepts of military culmination, hybrid war needs to incorporate the idea of information culmination discussed in the recommendations. Each battlefield of hybrid war has its own culminating point.

Questions

1. How will opponent seek to leverage his capabilities to force a friendly culmination?
2. How do information ops extend or limit my military culminating point?
3. What is the culminating point for current information narrative?
4. What is the opponents’ concept of their own culminating point?

Center of Gravity. McCuen concept of operational design for hybrid war diverges from doctrine in acknowledging multiple interlinked strategic centers of gravity that must be addressed simultaneously. For him these COGs remain relatively stable while Operational COGs shift. He identifies three strategic COGS, “(1) defeating the enemy’s conventional or nuclear forces and achieving the war’s strategic objectives; (2) clearing, controlling and counter-organizing the combat country population; and (3) establishing and maintaining support for the war by the home front and international community.”¹⁷⁹ Doctrinal concepts of critical capability (CC) critical requirement (CR) and critical vulnerability (CV) still apply to hybrid war. In hybrid war public will and support of friendly forces seems to be a reoccurring CV that must be protected. Enemy critical capabilities may be specialized technology that allows them to inflict casualties and sustain their information efforts.

Questions

1. How are the three Strategic COGs of hybrid war related and mutually supporting in the current context?
2. What are the operational COGs for each battlefield?
3. What are the CC, CR, and CV that allow friendly forces to influence domestic and international opinion?
4. How are critical requirements, capabilities and vulnerabilities applicable for each line of effort of hybrid war?
5. How are military and information CR, CC, and CV linked? Protected? And supporting?
6. How will my actions and enemy actions address the CV of public will?

Decisive Point. Hybrid war has multiple deceive points associated with each line of effort, but overall they must support informational advantages. There is an explicit need to include consideration of decisive points for information operations at each line of operations to contribute materially to achieving both military and information success.

Questions:

1. Are there “decisive” populations associated with each decisive point?
2. How will obtaining decisive points influence the obtainment of “Critical Population Objectives”¹⁸⁰
3. Which decisive points best allow the either side to gain or maintain the initiative?

Direct vs. Indirect. The balancing of direct and indirect approaches is central to hybrid war. Previous conceptions of war were less explicit in the need to directly influence opinions. In addition planners must acknowledge how those approaches directly and indirectly influence the decisive populations COG. The cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions needs to be expanded to address the direct and indirect effects of those actions beyond the traditional battlefield.

Questions:

1. How do actions against one COG directly or indirectly influence the others?
2. What are the means available at each level to directly influence key populations perceptions?
3. What is the risk of directly addressing popular support versus indirectly influencing population through cumulative military actions?
4. How do you quantify the indirect effects of actions?
5. How will direct attacks on the COG impact perceptions of legitimacy?

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. 60.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 69-70. “This choice of Critical Population Objectives will be tough, painful and, perhaps, decisive because on it is likely to rest the ultimate success or failure of the campaign.”

Forces and Functions. Hybrid war seeks a balanced approach to negating both enemy forces (conventional, irregular) and functions (informational, niche weapons). The campaign should plan specifically for how to disrupt the opponent's ability to promulgate their IO campaign. Hybrid war strategy must disrupt and negate the information capability of the opponent.¹⁸¹

Questions:

1. How does defeating the enemy forces contribute or not contribute to defeating enemy information operations?
2. What is the correct prioritization of efforts in initial stages of the campaign against enemy forces and enemy information capabilities?
3. What enemy functions (IO, niche technology) must be negated/destroyed? What is the appropriate force to negate or destroy those capabilities?

Anticipation. Anticipation facilitates gaining and maintaining psychical and cognitive initiative and allows the planner to exploit the physical gains of conventional and irregular successes. Anticipation is vital to maintaining initiative in information operations, forcing the adversary to react.

Questions:

1. How will operations influence perceptions of legitimacy?
2. What cultural information is necessary for effective anticipation of enemy IO, IW and conventional operations?
3. How will enemy react to conventional and irregular operations?
4. What are the specific concerns with collateral damage associated with conventional operations? What collateral damage considerations need to be considered?¹⁸²
5. What is the anticipated action of key populations? What actions may result?

Leverage. Hybrid war seeks a relative advantage in combat power and/or other circumstances against the adversary conventionally, irregularly and most importantly in the information environment sufficient to exploit friendly force advantages. Gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions grants friendly forces the initiative to leverage gains for decisive information advantages.

Questions:

1. How can the command leverage military operations for influence in the information environment?
2. What friendly actions will opponent seek to leverage for informational gain?
3. How will opponent leverage niche capabilities to attack friendly will? Seek support? Decrease friendly legitimacy with key audiences?
4. Is leverage possible with current forces and strategy?

Simultaneity and depth. Simultaneity is a hallmark and requirement of hybrid war.¹⁸³ The enemy will seek to disrupt operations. Friendly forces must simultaneously conduct multiple operations of different natures across the depth of all three battlefields.

¹⁸¹ That means that both planners and military forces in the field must gear operations to the perceptions of the home front and international community. That does not mean that certain operations not be mounted. It does mean that care must be exercised on how they are mounted.

¹⁸² McCuen, Art of Hybrid War, 74. "Even moderate collateral damage and civilian casualties are likely to result in severe loss of both home front and international support, not to mention combat country population support."

¹⁸³ Ibid., 13-14. "the conventional operations Center of Gravity of defeating the enemy's conventional forces must be achieved at each stage in the campaign if the decisive second and third Strategic Centers of Gravity are to be achieved. The key point, however, is simultaneous achievement of those second and third Centers of Gravity with

1. How will enemy seek to disrupt friendly forces simultaneity?
2. How will friendly forces actions conduct successful military operations while simultaneously maintaining support at home? Internationally?

Timing and tempo. Application of force in hybrid war must be selected to occur at such as time as to maintain both military and informational advantage. Tactical operations may be delayed to avoid or achieve an informational effect. Conventional and irregular operations should be synchronized to create windows of time for informational exploitation and to deny the enemy initiative.

Questions:

1. How will enemy seek to protract the conflict to both achieve military goal and attack opponents will?
2. How will tempo of operations impact international support and public will?
3. What is the correct time to employ force and not employ force for desired informational effect?
4. Is the timing or operations negating the narrative and decreasing legitimacy?
5. How will conventional operations and irregular operations stretch friendly and enemy capabilities?
6. How will tempo of operations provide or deny informational advantage or initiative?
7. How will short-term actions shape long-term perspectives?

Operational reach. Operational reach in hybrid war planning needs to address both traditional military efforts as well as the operational reach of information. The nature of modern information operations expands the operational reach and effects of both combatants' information campaigns.

1. What is the operational reach of information?
2. How will the enemy actions seek to attack/influence domestic will? What capabilities are enabling that operational reach
3. How can enemy actions influence international audience? What capabilities are enabling that operational reach?
4. What is the operational reach of friendly information efforts?

Lines of Operations. Line of operations / effort in hybrid war will be both physical and logical. Generic lines of effort would be Conventional warfare, irregular warfare, counterinsurgency warfare, influence operations for international support, influence operations for domestic support. McCuen argues that all Lines of Effort must be directed toward maintaining or increasing home front and international support.

Questions

1. How physical lines are best linked to logical lines?
2. Are LOE and LOO directed toward end state and goal of maintaining support of home front and international support?
3. What are the acceptable MOE of MOP to judge each LOO? LOE?

Simultaneity & Depth. Hybrid campaigns are inherently simultaneous. Hybrid opponents conduct operations simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Friendly forces planning must explicitly focus on how to simultaneously achieve population and military objectives.¹⁸⁴ The Depth of operations in hybrid war approaches that of a global campaign. (See Operational Reach above.) Attacks against public will and support are the means for the opponent to attack friendly forces in depth. Planning

achievement of the first is decisive for ultimate success. That means that the focus from beginning to end of the campaign must be on the combat country, the home front and international community populations."

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 13. "Thus, each campaign plan should have a major annex devoted to "Population Clearing, Control and Counter-Organization" and another major annex devoted to "Home Front and International Support," both of which must be conducted simultaneously with the conventional operations."

should seek to both attack the opponent in depth and deny them the opportunity to attack friendly forces in depth. Hybrid war planning must explicitly address this requirement.

Questions

1. What level of situation awareness is necessary to maintain simultaneous ops?
2. How can friendly operations degrade enemy synergy?
3. What friendly actions/institutions extend the depth of friendly operations?
4. What friendly actions/institutions are preventing simultaneous conduct of conventional, irregular, and IO operations?

Synergy. Hybrid war seeks a synergy between conventional, irregular and information operations that will deny the opponent the ability to synergize their own efforts. The integration and synchronizing of operations in hybrid war must focus on an end state that achieves military goals and maintains public support.

Questions

1. Are conventional, irregular, and information operations integrated?
2. Does the current integration disrupt the enemy militarily and informational?
3. How are other IOPS synchronized and integrated to sustain hybrid war strategy?
4. How will friendly forces determine if operations are unsynchronized?
- 5.

Arranging Operations. Operations in hybrid war must be arranged to achieve conventional, and counter mobilization objectives while simultaneously maintaining public support.¹⁸⁵ Under McCuen's concept, the immediate need is to defeat enemy conventional forces to set conditions for success of other counter organization and information operations.¹⁸⁶ The difficulty for friendly forces lies in predicting what arrangement of operations best accomplishes military goals while still maintaining legitimacy.

Questions

1. What arrangement of operations will best achieve strategic and operational goals?
2. What preconditions, shaping efforts would best increase the perception of legitimacy of friendly actions while decreasing legitimacy of opponent? (i.e. UN sanctions, public statements, etc.)
3. How will friendly forces implement decision points as to weight of effort (i.e. conventional vs. irregular vs. stability and support) without adversely affecting efforts against the other COGs?

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 74. "Now we need to discuss force tailoring, that is, determining the right mix, organization and sequence of forces required for the hybrid war mission. Our challenge is to configure them to fight simultaneously all three hybrid war Strategic Centers of Gravity. ... they must execute these operations so as to retain the support of the home front and international community"

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 72. McCuen does prioritize and suggest an arrangement for planning hybrid operations. "The first and most immediate requirement for the campaign must be the elimination of whatever may be the country's strategic offense capability." This is followed by counter organization all the while focused on obtaining popular support at home and internationally.